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PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 1994-1995

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Board of Auditors on the special audit of the Integrated Management Information System project, in accordance with Assembly decision 48/492 of 14 July 1994.

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ANNEX

Report of the Board of Auditors to the General Assembly on the special audit of the United Nations Integrated Management Information System, 18 November 1994

LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

Letter dated 18 November 1994 from the Chairman of the Board of Auditors to the Secretary-General of the United Nations

I have the honour to transmit to you the report of the Board of Auditors to the General Assembly on the special audit of the Integrated Management Information System project in accordance with General Assembly decision 48/492 of 14 July 1994, and the letter of transmittal to the President of the General Assembly.

(Signed) John BOURN
Comptroller and Auditor General
of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and Chairman
United Nations Board of Auditors

Letter dated 18 November 1994 from the Chairman of the Board of Auditors to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to present to you the report of the Board of Auditors to the General Assembly on the special audit of the Integrated Management Information System project in accordance with General Assembly decision 48/492 of 14 July 1994.

(Signed) John BOURN
Comptroller and Auditor General
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and Chairman
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its decision 48/492 of 14 July 1994, the General Assembly requested the Board of Auditors to conduct a special audit of the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) project, bearing in mind the proposals contained in the sixth progress report of the Secretary-General, a/ to review the causes of delays and cost overruns and the method of procurement of goods and services and to analyse the ongoing expenditures and projected costs, including implementation costs, for the bienniums 1994-1995 and 1996-1997. Accordingly, the Board carried out a special audit during September-October 1994.

2. The special audit was carried out at United Nations Headquarters in New York, supported by surveys conducted by the Board at offices away from Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Geneva and Vienna.

3. The Board had earlier reviewed IMIS as part of its audit of the United Nations and included its findings and recommendations in its report for the biennium ended 31 December 1993. b/ The special audit supplemented this review to the extent necessary, in accordance with the request of the General Assembly.

4. The Board's observations on all matters contained in the present report were communicated to the Administration. The Administration has confirmed the facts on which the Board's observations and conclusions are based and provided explanations and answers to the Board's queries.

5. A summary of main findings and recommendations is reported in paragraphs 6-13. The detailed findings of the audit are reported in paragraphs 14-78.

II. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

6. The Board was pleased to note that the shortcomings in the IMIS project identified in its previous audit of the project and reported to the General Assembly c/ have been addressed in the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's sixth progress report. a/ Taken as a whole, the Board's review of the proposals found that the corrective steps needed for the successful implementation of this very important project have been put in place. Further, we found that the general rationale for the revised estimates was soundly based. Nevertheless, the Board did identify some areas which require further attention and has made a number of detailed recommendations. It should also be noted that, as with all complex projects of this nature, it is not inconceivable that further difficulties may emerge as the project continues.

A. Summary of recommendations

7. The Board recommends that the following actions should be taken:

(a) In order to manage the project better and avoid further slippages in schedules:

(i) The implementation plan should be amplified to include a detailed allocation of resources to tasks and should be synchronized with the contractor's plans for software development, testing and other areas. The shortages and conflicts of United Nations staff resources identified as a result should be resolved expeditiously. An implementation coordinator in the IMIS development team and implementation teams in user departments should be prioritized for staffing (see para. 36);

(ii) The Steering Committee should devise a mechanism to speed up implementation-related decisions and actively monitor progress with reference to the implementation plan (see para. 38);

(iii) Offices away from Headquarters should be surveyed immediately to assess their technical infrastructure, the availability of electronic data processing skills related to IMIS and the extent and quality of data available for conversion to IMIS. The survey is essential for fine-tuning the implementation plan to suit the needs and capabilities of individual offices away from Headquarters (see para. 35);

(iv) The Electronic Services Division of the Secretariat should ensure that offices away from Headquarters procurement policy for personal computers is in harmony with their requirements of IMIS-compatible personal computers (see para. 73);

(b) In order to contain costs and keep the project within budget, the following are recommended:

(i) The project estimate should be increased by $1.6 million to $71.7 million to rectify discrepancies in the estimates incorporated in the sixth progress report (see paras. 42 and 43);

(ii) The estimates relating to implementation at offices away from Headquarters, except those relating to survey and installation tasks, should be revised after the proposed survey (see paras. 44 and 60);

(iii) The feasibility of assigning United Nations staff to maintenance and implementation tasks, especially for conducting training courses, in preference to contractual services, should be explored, as in-house implementation and maintenance support will be more cost effective than contractually supplied services. Further, implementation support staff should be identified, trained and positioned in time (see paras. 45 and 68);

(iv) User review of Release 3 (Accounting) development should be completed quickly and requests for changes monitored carefully to avoid further delays and costs. Similar action for Release 4 (Payroll) should be expedited. In particular, requirements of essential reports for all releases should be identified quickly to avoid structural adjustments to the software later which would be costly (see paras. 26, 27 and 30);

(v) The project development team should be allowed to concentrate on their activities by avoiding diversion to implementation-related activities. The Project Chief should be given adequate administrative support to monitor the software development contract closely, without detriment to the management of the IMIS development (see para. 78);

(vi) The task order method, incorporated in the second contract through Amendment 8, should be used for out-of-scope items and not for implementation-related activities (see para. 77);

(c) In order to realize the benefits from IMIS, the phasing out of existing systems which it is expected to replace should be planned and synchronized with its implementation (see para. 31).

B. Summary of findings

1. Causes of delays

8. The project, which was expected to be completed by December 1992, is now rescheduled for completion by mid-1997 owing to a variety of causes. The external design phase took longer than expected and as a consequence the selection of a contractor for the remaining phases of software development was delayed. The project slipped further when the second contractor assessed the time required for software development as 30 months instead of the original estimate of 24 months. In reality the time required for software development has further increased to 51 months owing to a number of factors, most notably, underestimation of the scope of the project, understaffing of the in-house development team, lack of adequate budget provision for implementation, diversion of both development team and contractor staff for implementation-related activities, delays by the United Nations and the contractor in discharging their contractual responsibilities and unexpected delays in converting data from existing systems (see paras. 14-24).

9. The schedule of implementation at offices away from Headquarters, which account for 77 per cent of the estimated transactions in IMIS, is not based on any detailed or current analysis of the tasks and effort required, and does not take cognizance of the differences in the technological maturity of the offices away from Headquarters (see paras. 33 and 34).

2. Causes of cost overrun

10. The project cost estimate has now been revised from $34.9 million to $70.16 million. Several factors are responsible for the cost escalation. Many significant items such as training and other implementation costs had not been included in the original project estimate. Delays caused by understaffing the development and implementation teams also contributed to the cost escalation. Owing to non-availability of staff resources, the United Nations had to use contractor staff for implementation and maintenance activities at higher costs. Changes in software and changes in strategy relating to implementation at offices away from Headquarters and training also increased costs. The current project estimate includes maintenance costs which were not included in the original estimate; on the other hand, the project has been rescoped by dropping some of the functions. The current estimate is also understated by $1.6 million (see paras. 40-44).

11. Several activities, such as training the users, software maintenance at offices away from Headquarters and the help desk, have been provided for through contractors at a higher cost, assuming the worst-case scenario of non-availability of United Nations staff resources (see para. 67).

3. Method of procurement

12. Major procurement of goods and services for IMIS has been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedures (see paras. 71-74).

13. There were eight amendments to the contract for software development, which increased the contract value from $17.0 million to $25.8 million. The major increases related to work that was outside the scope of the contract, implementation support and maintenance and compensation for delays. The contract amendment process is lengthy and on occasions succeeds rather than precedes the discharge of obligations being contracted. There were failures on the part of both parties to the contract in discharging contractual obligations that could have minimized "changes" and "out-of-scope work" as defined in the contract (see paras. 47 and 75-77).

III. DETAILED FINDINGS

A. Implementation of the project

14. The Board's earlier review of the IMIS project disclosed that it was largely a development project with no detailed planning for implementation, that the organizational structure needed for its timely and successful implementation had not been created and that the resources required for such a major project had been considerably underestimated. Further, implementation had suffered from lack of coordination, difficulty in the conversion of data from existing systems and other problems. The Board had, inter alia, recommended reassessment of the resources for implementing IMIS and suggested rescoping of the project. Some of the proposals contained in the sixth progress report of the Secretary-General are based on the outcome of the review of the Board. By and large, the Board's

review of the proposals show that the corrective steps needed for successful implementation of this important project have been taken.

B. Delays in implementation

1. Revised schedule

15. The General Assembly approved in December 1988 the implementation of IMIS over a three-and-a-half year period, by mid-1992, adapting the system used by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to suit United Nations requirements. In May 1989, the negotiations with FAO were abandoned and it was decided to develop a system customized for the United Nations. In November 1990, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly that the project was expected to be completed by December 1992 and become operational in 1993. However, according to the sixth progress report of the Secretary-General, the project is expected to be completed only by mid-1997.

2. Causes of delays

16. The Board noted that nearly six months had been lost in negotiating with FAO to purchase its system for adapting to United Nations requirements, before it was abandoned in May 1989. The first phase of software development, external design, had been delayed by over four months, until October 1990, as the study took longer than the projected six months. Although the delay in completing the external design impacted on the overall schedule of the project, this delay was understandable considering the volume of the work undertaken. Additionally, out-of-scope work was awarded to the contractor engaged for the external design, inter alia, to facilitate better interaction with offices away from Headquarters and the refinement of the external design. Although the final reports were produced only in March 1991, this additional time did not affect the schedule of the project as other concurrent activities were not disturbed.

17. The selection of the contractor for the remaining aspects of software development, internal design, programming conversion, etc. was expected to start by July 1990 after the completion of the external design and to be concluded in the last quarter of 1990. Notwithstanding the slippage in the external design phase, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly, in November 1990, that the project was expected to be completed on schedule (December 1992) by finalizing the selection of the second contractor in approximately three months, i.e., by February 1991. This did not happen and the selection of the contractor was completed only on 1 July 1991. This slippage of nearly six months in the selection of the contractor, largely caused by the delay in the completion of the external design phase, resulted in a corresponding delay in the software development.

18. The request for proposal for the contract for software development (issued on 1 February 1991) stipulated completion of the project by the end of 1993, including implementation in offices away from Headquarters. However, when the contract was signed on 9 August 1991, the project completion date was postponed to January 1994 for implementation at Headquarters and to July 1994 at offices

away from Headquarters, based on the detailed assessment of work, furnished by the contractor. At that point in time, the project completion date had slipped cumulatively by 25 months, from mid-1992 to July 1994.

19. In March 1992, the IMIS Steering Committee changed the strategy and decided to implement IMIS in five releases, (personnel management, staff entitlements and recruitment, accounting, payroll and budget formulation and world-wide data transmission), but did not envisage further change in the completion date for the project. However, by May 1993, the expected completion date had been shifted by a further six months to July 1994 for Headquarters and January 1995 for offices away from Headquarters. Release 1 was finally implemented at Headquarters in September 1993.

20. In January 1994, the second contractor reassessed the estimated hours for completing the other releases, based on the experience of developing and implementing Release 1, and requested modification of the contract to provide additional funding and an extension of time. In September 1994, the Committee on Contracts approved an amendment extending the contract up to October 1995 and providing for 42,712 additional work-hours. Through this amendment, 28,835 work-hours were also deleted from the contract to reflect the decision in June 1994 to rescope the IMIS project by dropping Release 5 and parts of Release 4.

21. Against the earlier projection of six months for complete implementation at all the offices away from Headquarters after implementation at Headquarters, the sixth progress report envisages implementation of Releases 1 and 2 at offices away from Headquarters between the third quarter of 1995 and the second quarter of 1996 and Releases 3 and 4 between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 1997. In effect, the time-frame for software development at Headquarters has been extended from 30 months to 51 months, while the time-frame for implementation at offices away from Headquarters has been revised from 6 months to 18 months.

3. Delays in software development

22. The Board further analysed the slippage in schedules in respect of software development. The Board noted that the United Nations had delayed accepting the deliverables produced by the second contractor, which, contractually, should be accepted within 15 days.

23. The Board noted also that several changes in the user requirements had resulted in 30,000 additional work-hours for the contractor for providing new or enhanced functionality, as determined with reference to the initial contract. These changes were necessitated largely by omissions during the definition of requirements and in the design specifications. The Board further noted delays in resolving issues relating to system enhancements or modifications arising from changes in user requirements owing either to work-pressure or to difficulty in resolving procedural issues. According to the contractor, the diversion of resources to implementation-related tasks resulting from the United Nations inability to provide staff resources in time also affected the schedules for

development of Releases 2 and 3, although the contractor had been compensated for 23,918 work-hours for implementation support.

24. While basically concurring with the analysis of the reasons for time overrun, the Administration pointed out, in regard to the changes in, and omissions in the definition of, user requirements and omissions in design specifications, that "it is normal that in a system of the size and complexity of IMIS, extra work be identified and omissions found" and added that "we also think that the actual lack of uniformity in procedures, lack of a global and integrated policy approach to issues in the Department and lack of systems enforcing consistent processing have led to the fact that it is only when the development of the system is already advanced that new requirements are identified".

4. Remedial measures

25. The Board noted several recent significant actions by the Administration to strengthen the implementation of the project such as rescoping of the project, rebudgeting of resources and a "war-room effort" for cleansing data. However, the Board believes that a few important aspects (see paras. 26-36) need attention and resolution to avert potential problems and further slippages.

26. The management and other reports required from Releases 2 to 4 have not yet been finalized and this poses a risk of the system not being able to produce the final output as required or requiring modification of predesigned input processes. The Administration stated that the majority of reports required for Release 3 had been identified and that it was "fully aware of the magnitude of the task in this area and this is undoubtfully one of the major areas where the analysis of requirements was the most deficient".

27. Several issues relating to modifications of, and enhancements to, Releases 2 and 3 were pending resolution. The Board was informed that all issues related to enhancements to Release 2 had been resolved.

28. The integration of the functions relating to procurement services, currently using a software package, is contingent on the availability of a new version of the software, and its subsequent purchase and installation. The contract for the new version of the software was expected to be signed by 31 October 1994 and the software scheduled to be delivered by 31 December 1994.

29. A review of the report facilities in IMIS showed that the user interface was very cumbersome and did not conform to IMIS standards. The Board, however, noted that the United Nations had completed the development of its own user-friendly reporting module to be incorporated in IMIS shortly.

30. The second contractor steeply revised the estimated hours for the development of the payroll module, from 8,067 hours to 14,016 hours, primarily on the grounds that the original requirements drawn up nearly three-and-a-half years ago would undergo revisions. The United Nations has provided for an additional coordinator and systems analyst on the development team, but it is important that the relevant user departments are also geared up to participate

in the user requirements specification and acceptance testing to avoid slippage in the schedule.

31. The staggered implementation of various releases at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters has necessitated the continuance of some existing systems until the complete implementation of IMIS. For instance, the Integrated Personnel and Payroll System, the General Accounting System and the Treasury Information Processing System will have to continue to meet some of the information requirements of the United Nations. This involves staff resources to sustain existing systems, transfer of data between systems and maintaining consistency between IMIS and such systems. These additional tasks are likely to stretch United Nations staff resources even more. The Administration informed the Board that it was working towards discontinuing the maintenance of the Integrated Personnel and Payroll System as of June 1995 and that work was being undertaken to assess better the interface requirements for the other systems. The Board recommends that, in order to realize the benefits from IMIS, the phasing out of the existing systems, which it is expected to replace, should be planned and synchronized with its implementation.

32. The Board's earlier review had revealed that offices away from Headquarters were not well prepared for the implementation of IMIS. The Board, therefore, had then recommended that a schedule for implementing IMIS at offices away from Headquarters should be drawn up and that several preparatory activities that had large lead times should be prioritized and started in a phased manner.

33. Although the schedule and a broad strategy for implementation have now been formulated, the Board feels that the following factors should be managed properly to avoid slippage. The schedule for offices away from Headquarters, which account for 77 per cent of the estimated transactions in IMIS, has been determined largely on the basis of outdated information concerning the tasks and technical infrastructure. For example, information is not current concerning the availability of a site for installing the main servers, cabling for networking, potential users of IMIS and availability of sufficient numbers of terminals for all IMIS users.

34. Further, the strategy does not identify the staff resources needed at offices away from Headquarters for technical support, data collection, data conversion and cleansing and of the availability of users for training. The Board has not seen evidence to support the availability of adequate skilled staff resources at Headquarters to undertake the implementation missions to all offices away from Headquarters within the time-frame indicated in the sixth progress report. The software modification requirements for offices away from Headquarters identified in that report are only estimates for the installation of IMIS and do not cover the potential requirements for bridging IMIS with other systems that may have to be continued until IMIS is fully implemented and even beyond.

35. For implementation at offices away from Headquarters, the Board recommended that the initial survey mission should be completed as a priority and, based on the assessment of technical infrastructure and availability of data, personnel and skills, a detailed project report could be drawn up dealing, inter alia, with the scope of the work to be executed, the time-frame for implementation and

the financial and human resources needed to accomplish the project. That report could be the baseline for committing resources and monitoring progress. Needless to say, the report should be synchronized with plans and resource availability at Headquarters. The Administration agreed with the recommendation and clarified that surveys of three offices away from Headquarters were planned for completion by December 1994. The Administration also expressed its confidence in achieving the implementation of the system within the time-frame, as it believed that it was an objective assessment.

36. For implementation at Headquarters, the Board recommended that the United Nations implementation plan be synchronized with the second contractor's detailed work plan. The Board stressed the importance of identifying and assigning United Nations staff resources to the tasks in the implementation plan to facilitate early identification and resolution of resource conflicts. The development team should be left completely free to concentrate on development issues such as design issues, user acceptance, modifications, enhancements, etc., as delays in accepting deliverables and inadequate attention to such issues through preoccupation with implementation-related issues have immediate cost implications and carry the risk of costly modifications being required later. An implementation coordinator in the IMIS team and implementation teams in the user departments should be priorities for staffing. The Board also recommended that the data conversion and cleansing requirements for Releases 2 and 3 should be assessed in detail and firm deadlines set for their completion.

37. While agreeing with the recommendations, the Administration informed the Board that major progress had been made in the area, that it was still actively working on finalizing the plan at a more detailed level and that the Steering Committee would monitor the progress of work on the basis of the work plan. The Administration also clarified that it expected to resolve quickly the difficulties faced in the identification of resources available for implementation in the areas of human resources and support services.

38. Globally, the Board recommended that the IMIS Steering Committee devise a mechanism to speed up implementation-related decisions and actively monitor progress with reference to the implementation plan. The Administration asserted that the Steering Committee was committed to avoiding further delays in the implementation dates.

39. According to the Administration, major changes in the Organization and instability in the Department of Administration and Management had an impact on the project development. Had that new situation not developed, more emphasis and resources could have been placed on the project, thus reducing considerably the slippage that occurred.

C. Cost of the project

40. The General Assembly approved the implementation of IMIS at an estimated cost of $28 million at 1988 rates. The estimates were revised to $34.39 million in the programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993 and recently, in the sixth progress report to $70.16 million. For its analysis of cost overruns, including the ongoing expenditures and projected costs for the bienniums 1994-1995 and 1996-1997, the Board adopted the estimate in the 1992-1993 programme budget as the baseline, as it reflected the scope of the project more accurately than the estimate approved in 1988.

41. Between the 1992-1993 programme budget and the sixth progress report the cost increased by $35.77 million, an increase of 104 per cent, as shown below:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Programme budget 1992-1993	New estimate (sixth progress report)			Increase (decrease over programme budget 1992-1993)		Expenditure until 31 Dec. 1993
	Amount	Total	Project	Maintenance	Amount	Percentage	Amount
General temporary assistance	5 919.3	14 306.9	13 870.2	436.7	8 387.6	141.7	4 116.7
Travel of staff	567.3	2 593.1	2 593.1	0.0	2 025.8	357.1	395.9
Hardware	7 887.1	4 528.5	3 415.0	1 113.5	(3 358.6)	-42.6	1 288.3
Data processing services - software	1 885.0	2 907.6	2 409.9	497.7	1 022.6	54.2	859.9
Supplies	67.2	294.9	294.9	0.0	227.7	338.8	99.9
Communications	111.3	271.0	271.0	0.0	159.7	143.5	111.0
Training	415.8	5 516.7	5 516.7	0.0	5 100.9	1 226.8	1 077.3
Contractual services	17 536.8	39 744.1	32 809.2	6 934.9	22 207.3	126.6	19 062.6
Total	34 389.8	70 162.8	61 180.0	8 982.8	35 773.0	104.0	27 011.6

42. In assessing the cost overrun, it has to be noted that the current estimate should be treated as $71.7 million after rectifying discrepancies noticed by the Board. It is also to be noted that the estimate of $34.39 million in the 1992-1993 programme budget included $2.41 million under contractual services for functions now abandoned by rescoping the project. On the other hand, in respect of maintenance, the current estimate includes $3.61 million towards recurring expenditures and $5.37 million towards one-time expenditures, both of which were not incorporated in the 1992-1993 programme budget.

D. Major causes of cost overrun

1. Contractual services

43. The Board pointed out and the Administration agreed that on the basis of the work indicated in the sixth progress report, the estimate for contractual services should be increased by $1.6 million, from $39.74 million to $41.33 million.

44. The sixth progress report estimate includes $22.27 million for contractual services during 1994-1997, $11.09 million towards outstanding payments to the second contractor and the remaining $11.18 million towards other contractual services related mainly to implementation in offices away from Headquarters. The Board recommended that the estimates relating to implementation support and software modification at offices away from Headquarters be reconfirmed after the proposed survey. The Administration agreed to do so.

45. The estimate for maintenance activities is based on the assumption that these implementation-related activities would be performed through the contractor. The Board believes that, in the long run, these tasks are best handled in-house. While agreeing with the suggestion, the Administration stated that it would be in a better position to assess the real need after the survey at offices away from Headquarters and that, whenever possible, in-house staff resources would be used.

46. As regards the help desk, the Board felt that, being a recurring maintenance activity, this could be performed at a lesser cost by deploying United Nations staff. Indeed, the function was better discharged by persons familiar with the United Nations system. The Board was informed that although some of the activities would certainly be handled by United Nations staff after the completion of implementation, shortage of staff resources might force the use of additional assistance. The Administration agreed to study how the Board's suggestion could be implemented.

47. The value of the second contract increased from $17.01 million to $25.80 million after deleting certain items, valued at $2.41 million. The Board noted that the major increases in the contract related to work which was outside the scope of the contract ($5.38 million), implementation support and maintenance ($2.07 million) and compensation for delays ($3.57 million).

48. The out-of-scope items amounted to 46.5 per cent of the total work-hours provided for Releases 1 to 3. This very large increase arose on account of

changes to design specifications in order to improve the system or rectify design deficiencies, revision of data models, revision of report specifications, inadequate definition of user requirements at various stages of review, i.e., external design, internal design and unit testing, etc., and changes in the scope of training.

49. According to the Administration, the amount for out-of-scope expenditure had been maintained at a reasonable level justified by the complexity of the project. The Administration further stated that "in many cases, the development of the system has been the first opportunity for the Organization to look into its procedures. Many of the issues that required major out-of-scope expenditure, namely concerning technical cooperation activities, are related to the fact that the Organization did not, and in many cases still does not, have consistent policies and procedures. The scope of the project is also so broad that it is natural that new specifications be identified while the project progresses in its work".

50. The implementation support and maintenance relate to tasks such as supervising and coordinating the work of United Nations staff, direct assistance to users, assistance to and coordinating data conversion tasks performed by United Nations staff, assistance in data collection, modifying user profiles, providing an implementation manager, writing desk manuals (desk procedures), etc. Although these tasks were to be performed by United Nations staff members, the contractor was asked to assign staff for these tasks, at hourly rates, owing to "lack of human resources in the Organization".

51. The Board believes that general unpreparedness for the implementation of IMIS has resulted in this cost escalation which could have been avoided by mobilizing the staff resources needed. The Administration stated that the Department of Administration and Management did not have sufficient capacity during the period 1992-1994 to assign resources to IMIS-related activities owing to a reduction in posts, increased activities for peace-keeping missions, which required assignment of a high number of staff from the Department. According to the Administration the escalation in costs could have been only partially avoided through the hiring of additional temporary staff.

52. A part of the compensation for delays ($2.34 million) relates to compensation claimed by the contractor for additional costs resulting from a delay in acceptance of deliverables, extra efforts owing to changes in specifications and diversion of staff for implementation-related tasks. The remaining part ($1.23 million) relates to compensation for time-based management and administrative services claimed by the contractor for the extended period of the contract from January 1994 to October 1995. The compensation was determined after negotiations during which the contractor accepted 25 per cent responsibility for delays.

53. The Board believes that the entire compensation was an avoidable cost without value addition and such costs are bound to escalate with every postponement of the completion date. The Administration, however, stated that "the issue here again is related to the lack of resources the Organization could assign to the project for the period 1990-1994. Certainly the contractual costs could have been reduced but this reduction would have been offset to a large

extent by the fact that we would have needed to assign to the project team ... at least 18 to 20 additional staff for at least two years each, at an additional cost that would have been close to $3 million".

2. General temporary assistance

54. General temporary assistance has increased by $8.39 million. The increase has been caused by the strengthening of the development team, continuance of the development team for a longer period because of the extension of the project and staff required for implementation and maintenance tasks not provided for earlier.

55. The Board noted that the business area coordinators in the development team would be phased out in stages after the implementation of the releases for which they were responsible. As IMIS was an integrated system involving linkages between releases and between United Nations Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters, the Board recommended that it would be prudent not to disturb the business area coordinators in the development team until the full implementation of IMIS in all the offices away from Headquarters. The Administration stated that it would take note of the suggestion and reconsider it in the course of 1995 during the preparation of the 1996-1997 budget, taking into account the progress of work for implementation at offices away from Headquarters.

56. While noting the proposal to strengthen the project team by the addition of an implementation coordinator, a systems analyst exclusively for payroll and an administrative officer, the Board stressed the need to fill the posts expeditiously as any vacancy would lead to costly delays in the project. Besides the strengthening of the development team, the Board emphasized the importance of user departments identifying persons who would participate in user requirements specification and acceptance testing. Expressing its agreement, the Administration stated that it had already closely associated payroll staff in the design of other parts of the system.

57. The Board noted that the estimate in the sixth progress report did not include the cost of United Nations staff resources required for implementation at offices away from Headquarters, although their travel costs had been included, presumably because the resources would be released internally. In view of the importance of qualified resources for implementation at offices away from Headquarters the Board recommended that the availability of such resources within the time-frames indicated should be carefully considered. Concurring with the recommendation, the Administration stated that the issue would be carefully considered when the planning of missions was undertaken.

58. The sixth progress report did not deal with members of transition teams for offices away from Headquarters who would have to work with the regional coordinators and teams at United Nations Headquarters and who might have to be released from their regular activities during IMIS implementation. The Board was informed that "the situation in the offices away from Headquarters is still largely unknown. It is therefore extremely difficult to budget now for temporary assistance for these functions. We will, however, study ways for addressing this issue with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee so that the necessary adjustments can be made if the need arises".

59. Data cleansing had proved to be a major bottleneck for Release 1, leading to the repeated postponement of implementation and consequent cost overruns. The Board felt that, without a detailed estimate of data conversion and identification of United Nations personnel who would handle such tasks, it was difficult to derive assurance that that critical activity would be performed on schedule. The Administration stated that it had provided $540,000 for data entry, initiated advance action for data collection and cleansing at offices away from Headquarters based on the experience gained from Release 1 and that the majority of the data already resided at United Nations Headquarters. It was, however, clarified that some additional expenditures might be incurred, although that would be difficult to assess now.

3. Travel

60. Travel costs have increased by $2.03 million. The Board noted that the current estimates envisaged significant amount of travel by Headquarters staff ($1.06 million) and contractors ($1.09 million) to offices away from Headquarters for initial surveys of infrastructure and data, installation of software and implementation, including training. This accounts for about 83 per cent of the total travel budget, reflecting the under-estimation earlier. The Board appreciates the need for the visits envisaged, but is unable to endorse fully the estimate of $1.66 million relating to travel costs for the teams for implementation and training, as these are not based on any recent survey of the infrastructure or assessment of the number of potential users of IMIS. The estimate does not take cognizance of the differences in the technological maturity of the different offices away from Headquarters. The estimate therefore needs to be firmed up in due course.

4. Hardware

61. Hardware costs have been reduced by $3.36 million. The reduction is primarily a result of a decrease in hardware prices and the exclusion of users' personal computers from the IMIS budget on the grounds that the personal computers would be financed from the budget for acquisition or replacement of office automation equipment, although a number of extra servers are now contemplated for managing reporting requirements without degrading the performance of the system. The Board, however, noted that the 1988 estimates provided for $3.1 million for the terminals; the details of the hardware estimate in the 1992-1993 programme budget were not available.

5. Software

62. Software costs have gone up by $1.02 million. Nearly half of this increase ($497,700) represents provision for maintenance which had not been included in the 1992-1993 programme budget. A further increase of $800,000 is accounted for by a decision to use an inventory management software for purchasing functions and integrate it with IMIS instead of a custom development within IMIS; there has been a consequential reduction under contractual services. The Administration pointed out that owing to successful negotiations with vendors, the further increase in cost had been partially offset by lower purchase costs of other components.

63. A provision of $1.6 million has been made for hardware and software maintenance, neither of which was included in the 1992-1993 programme budget.

6. Training

64. Training costs have increased by $5.1 million. The estimate has gone up by 1,226.8 per cent, which clearly suggests earlier underbudgeting. In the 1988 estimates, training had been completely omitted. In the 1992-1993 programme budget, the main component of the estimate for training related to technical training. The increase now is explained by the enlargement of the scope as follows:

(a) Training development ($1,786,123), which includes developing a training strategy, training materials and a performance support facility through the second contractor;

(b) Delivering training to the users of IMIS ($3,730,577).

The Board is of the view that the failure to budget adequately for training was a glaring omission, considering the size and complexity of the project. The Board, however, noted that the training of users has been, and is proposed to be, done through contractors, whereas the second contract had envisaged only training of trainers.

65. The training estimate is based on the assumption that training in offices away from Headquarters will be imparted mainly through contractors travelling from New York and staying at each office away from Headquarters for eight weeks for Releases 1 and 2, and 10 weeks for Releases 3 and 4. The travel, daily subsistence allowance (DSA) and contractual costs for this are shown below:

(United States dollars)

Release	Contractor's cost	Travel	DSA	Total
1 and 2	967 680	101 360	235 200	1 304 240
3 and 4	1 512 000	126 700	367 500	2 006 200
Total	2 479 680	228 060	602 700	3 310 440

66. The Board believes that there is scope for economy. Deploying staff from Headquarters would eliminate, at least partially, contractor's costs and it may also be feasible since implementation at Headquarters precedes implementation at offices away from Headquarters and several users at Headquarters would already have been exposed to IMIS. Identifying persons in the respective offices away from Headquarters who can be trainers would reduce travel and DSA costs also; the cost of training them as trainers through the second contractor, as per the contract for Headquarters training, is relatively negligible. This would relieve pressure on Headquarters to find trainers and release them for long spells. Considering the long-term needs of IMIS, in particular long-term training requirement for new employees and the long lead-time available in the proposed schedule for implementation at offices away from Headquarters, the latter option seems the most logical to adopt.

67. The Board noted that as in the case of other activities like software maintenance and the help desk, the estimate for training had been prepared for the worst-case scenario, i.e., on the assumption that in-house resources would not be available even at Headquarters for training at offices away from Headquarters. The Board also noted that no recent reliable survey of potential users was available to estimate fairly the number of trainers and the total duration of direct training needed. The Board's own survey of four offices away from Headquarters revealed wide variations in estimates over time.

68. The Board believes that training must be in-house as far as possible, especially as IMIS is an ongoing project. Identifying staff at offices away from Headquarters, and associating them with implementation from the earliest stages would facilitate building up training resources and delivering training at lower costs. As IMIS has an elaborate performance support facility, the original strategy of training the trainers through a contractor still appears to be a more cost-effective option. This would also reduce the travel budget significantly.

69. As with offices away from Headquarters, the cost of training of users at Headquarters for Releases 2 to 4 has been estimated on the assumption that it will be imparted through contractors and is based on approximate numbers of users for Releases 3 and 4. The approximation seems reasonable, although the Board believes that identifying trainers and using the Staff Administration and Training Division at Headquarters to deliver training may be a more cost-effective and enduring arrangement.

70. While agreeing that the best approach for training might be to use in-house resources duly trained, whenever possible, the Administration felt that it might not be able to identify enough staff to be trained as trainers. The Board was further informed that "one of the major problems encountered for the implementation of Release 1 at Headquarters was the lack of availability of staff in the users' areas, and in the Office of Human Resources Administration in particular. The new estimates envisage the direct training of users in the event that we would not be able to identify enough staff to be trained as trainers". The Administration, however, emphasized that it was its firm intention to associate United Nations staff in the training process, especially at offices away from Headquarters, as much as possible.

E. Procurement of goods and services

71. The procurement of goods and services in respect of the IMIS project could be broadly classified as:

(a) Hardware and proprietary software;

(b) Services for technical advice, software development and other implementation and maintenance functions.

The Board reviewed the procurement of the major components.

1. Hardware and software

72. The major purchases of hardware related to the Hewlett-Packard servers for Headquarters and those of software related to Sybase and Pro-Kappa. The Board noted that the prescribed procedures for procurement had been followed.

73. The Board had earlier reviewed the procurement of personal computers at Headquarters and its findings were included in paragraphs 152 and 153 of the Board's report for the biennium ended 31 December 1993. b/ During the special audit of the IMIS project, the Board pointed out the importance of the Electronic Services Division ensuring uniformity in the procurement policy for personal computers at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters, so that personal computers procured were IMIS-compatible. The Administration stated that it fully appreciated the need for standardization of the personal computers and that "this recommendation will be examined by the Electronic Services Division and possibly submitted to Technological Innovations Board for a decision before being communicated to all officers concerned".

2. Contractual services

74. The expenditure on contractual services includes payments relating to two major contracts for IMIS and a variety of contractual services covering technical advice, quality assurance, data entry and data conversion, etc. The Board examined the major components, i.e., the contract for external design and the contract for the remaining phases of software development. The Board was satisfied that both contracts had been finalized in accordance with United Nations regulations and procedures.

75. The Board also reviewed eight amendments to the second major contract and noted that the United Nations had, on several occasions, delayed acceptance of deliverables, leading to claims for compensation. The Board noted further that the contractor had not always discharged the contractual obligation to "conduct reviews of interim and final work products with United Nations participation" or "conduct structured walk-throughs of major deliverables with United Nations members of the IMIS team and user representatives" which could have minimized the "changes" and "out-of-scope work" as defined in the contract. The Administration stated that the majority of out-of-scope issues were identified through the walk-through of the external design of the system performed by the contractor for representatives of Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters, although the contractor did not conduct as many walk-throughs as included in the contractor's proposal. The Administration further clarified that that was one of the arguments used by the United Nations while negotiating the compensation for delays claimed by the contractor and which led the contractor to accept 25 per cent responsibility for the delays.

76. The Board noted that the contract amendment process was lengthy and had, on one occasion, been concluded after the completion of all the items of work contemplated and even after the disbursement of payments therefor.

77. Amendment 8 to the contract provided $1,495,000 for execution of work through a "task-order procedure" by which the IMIS Project Chief was empowered to issue a task order for executing work not yet identified and that that provision had been incorporated to enable execution of work without contractual amendments where such work could not be anticipated. While the Board believed that that might be necessary in the interest of timely execution of work, considering the lengthy contract amendment process, it recommended the creation of a mechanism to prevent the use of that provision for implementation-related activities that should appropriately be performed by United Nations staff. The Administration agreed to limit to the maximum extent possible the usage of these funds for implementation related activities.

78. The Board further recommended that, because of the potential for cost-escalation, the servicing of the contract should be given more attention by providing adequate administrative support to the IMIS Project Chief. The Administration agreed and stated that efforts were being made to fill the positions rapidly.

IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

79. The Board wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperation and assistance extended by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Directors-General of the United Nations Offices at Geneva and Vienna, the Executive Secretaries of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, their officers and members of their staff.

(Signed) John BOURN
Comptroller and Auditor General
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

(Signed) Osei Tutu PREMPEH
Auditor-General of Ghana

(Signed) Codanda Ganapathy SOMIAH
Comptroller and Auditor General
of India

Notes

a/ A/C.5/48/12/Add.1.

b/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 5 (A/49/5).

c/ Ibid., chap. II, paras. 105-133.

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COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

Command and control of United Nations peace-keeping operations

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 48/42 of 10 December 1993, the General Assembly urged the Secretary-General to initiate a comprehensive review of the role, tasks and functions of the various units of the Secretariat with a view, inter alia, to assuring the unity of command and control indispensable for successful peace-keeping. The Assembly also called upon the Secretary-General, in its resolution 48/43 of 10 December 1993, to review and take urgent steps to strengthen present arrangements for political direction and military command and control, to improve coordination with humanitarian and civilian aspects of peace-keeping operations, and to strengthen existing arrangements for consultation and exchange of information among the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

2. Since that time, substantial improvements have been made in the consultative process among the Security Council, the troop contributors and the Secretariat and have been welcomed by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations (see A/49/136) and the Security Council (S/PRST/1994/22). The Secretary-General has also continued his efforts, reported in his reports on improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping (A/48/403) and the restructuring of the United Nations Secretariat (A/49/336), to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity for peace-keeping, especially in building up in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations the functional expertise required for effective executive direction and management of operations. In addition, the Secretary-General has made far-reaching proposals (see A/48/707 and A/48/945 and Corr.1) to streamline administrative procedures which have a direct impact on the Organization's ability to support and staff peace-keeping operations, including their civilian components, in a timely and effective manner.

3. In preparing the present report the Secretary-General has benefited from a wide variety of Member States' views, expressed in formal and informal settings, including the Security Council discussions which resulted in the presidential statement cited above, the deliberations of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, an informal gathering of States convened and hosted by the Government of Canada in late April 1994, and others. The reservoir of practical experience of current and former United Nations force commanders who participated in a meeting at Headquarters on command and control arrangements in November 1993 has also been drawn upon.

II. LEVELS OF COMMAND

4. In United Nations peace-keeping operations it is useful to distinguish three levels of command: (1) overall political direction, the purview of the Security Council; (2) executive direction and control, provided by the Secretary-General; and (3) command in the field, residing in the chief of mission, i.e., the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or, in cases where no Special Representative is approved, the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer.

5. The three levels constitute a conceptual whole in that each can only be understood in relation to the others, and they comprise a practical continuum in that none can be fully effective in isolation. These close links notwithstanding, the distinctions among levels are real and are important to maintain conceptually as well as operationally, avoiding a blurring of functions and responsibilities. Just as overall political objectives reflecting the will of the international community could not be readily formulated in the field, so it would not be wise to decide matters at United Nations Headquarters in New York that require an understanding of operational conditions which can only be acquired in the field. To ensure that the latter type of judgement is made and then acted upon soundly, on the basis of a well-rounded grasp of the situation, multidimensional operations typically are headed in the field by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with clearly defined authority, which extends over all mission components. The Special Representative is able to draw on the respective areas of expertise of those components.

III. DEFINING UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

6. There has been a certain amount of discussion of late as to the degree of authority which the United Nations chiefs of mission exercise over national contingents assigned to a peace-keeping operation. In some exceptional cases, troops have been offered with prior restrictions of a nature which would have severely compromised the contingent's usefulness, and offers made on those conditions have had to be declined. In general, United Nations command is not full command and is closer in meaning to the generally recognized military concept of "operational command". It involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council; (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal requires adequate prior notification; and (3) a specific geographical range (the mission area as a whole). An additional limitation is

that the Organization does not discipline or promote individual members of military contingents, functions which remain the purview of their national authorities. While the United Nations, on the basis of consultations with potential troop contributors, has accepted by prior agreement certain restrictions on the use of a given contingent, it cannot accept restrictions which would overly limit the necessary flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre which a head of mission must have in order to ensure operational effectiveness. In any case, Governments which do not wish their forces to be used in certain ways must make this known at the outset when the troops are offered; if such restrictions do not become apparent until a crisis arises in the field, the safety and security of other contingents and the success of the mission as a whole could be jeopardized.

7. If it is to be effective a United Nations operation must function as one integrated unit reflecting the will of the international community as a whole. International forces can be vulnerable to attempts by the parties to the conflict to differentiate between contingents and single them out for favourable or unfavourable treatment. This may lead to repercussions in the home countries as well as on the ground which can seriously undermine an operation. Experience has clearly demonstrated that when command in the field is divided and military units receive guidance from national as well as United Nations Headquarters the difficulties inherent in an international operation are maximized and the risk of casualties rises. Maintaining the integrated, strictly international character of an operation remains the best safeguard against such a development. Clearly, then, it is impermissible for contingent commanders to be instructed by national authorities to depart from United Nations policies, or to refuse to carry out orders. Not only do such practices jeopardize the effectiveness of a mission and the safety and security of its personnel, they undermine the very legitimacy of the institution of United Nations peace-keeping.

IV. STRENGTHENING OVERALL POLITICAL DIRECTION

8. Decisions on mandates and overall policy regarding peace-keeping operations are in the competence of the Security Council, while implementation of those decisions is the purview of the Secretary-General and the chief of mission. Without prejudice to the authority of any of these officials, there is a practical necessity to engage the troop contributors in dialogue in order to establish clear understandings about the mandate and the goal of the mission from the outset, thus also enhancing prospects for unity of command once troops are in the field. Such consultations are particularly important to achieve the most effective use of resources, keeping in view the fact that the availability of resources is unusually complicated in an Organization which does not possess resources of its own and which has no ready strategic reserve.

9. The effectiveness of peace-keeping operations and their command and control systems is largely affected by clear understandings between the entities taking political decisions, bearing operational responsibility, and providing human and material resources. The process of exchanging views among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop contributors has developed considerably in the recent past and has been welcomed by all concerned. These meetings are not limited to briefings about recent events but are an opportunity for substantive

discussion. Such meetings are normally convened whenever a Special Representative of the Secretary-General or a Force Commander or Chief Military Observer visits United Nations Headquarters.

10. In an enlargement of this practice, the Security Council has recently decided (S/PRST/1994/62 of 4 November 1994), inter alia, that meetings should be held as a matter of course between members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to facilitate the exchange of information and views before the Council takes decisions on the extension or termination of, or significant changes in, the mandate of a particular peace-keeping operation. Such meetings would be chaired jointly by the President of the Council and a representative of the Secretary-General and would be in addition to those convened and chaired by the Secretariat for troop contributors to meet with special representatives of the Secretary-General or to discuss operational matters concerning particular peace-keeping operations.

V. STRENGTHENING EXECUTIVE DIRECTION, COMMAND AND CONTROL

11. The growing number of United Nations operations for the maintenance of international peace and security and their increasingly complex nature have made it essential that the relevant departments of the Secretariat function as an integrated whole, under the authority and control of the Secretary-General, but with clear, distinct responsibilities, in order to avoid duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. Specifically with regard to this division of labour, the Department of Political Affairs is the political arm of the Secretary-General in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and the control and resolution of conflicts within States. As such, it advises the Secretary-General on policy in these areas and is responsible for political research and analysis. It also has executive responsibilities in the fields of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, including negotiations and other diplomatic activities. All these functions and responsibilities as they relate to field operations are prepared and carried out by the Department under the overall direction of the Secretary-General.

12. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs is responsible for the coordination of humanitarian operations, particularly for making the necessary arrangements for the timely and effective delivery of assistance by the relief organizations of the United Nations system. As the focal point of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance, its responsibilities also include early warning, needs assessment missions, consolidated appeals and mobilization of resources, as well as negotiations on access to populations in need. In most recent complex operations, the Department has appointed a field-based humanitarian coordinator who works under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and is in direct contact with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. In some cases the humanitarian coordinator is with an agency or programme, while in others he or she is independent.

13. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations is the operational arm of the Secretary-General for the day-to-day management of peace-keeping operations. In this capacity, the Department acts as the main channel of communication between United Nations Headquarters and the field. However, the Department of Political

Affairs on strictly political matters, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs on humanitarian policy matters and the Department of Administration and Management are also in regular contact with the field.

14. In order to ensure cohesion and effective control, guidance for peace-keeping operations from United Nations Headquarters must be effectively coordinated among the departments concerned. For this purpose, inter alia, the departments coordinate with each other at all levels, participate in the Secretary-General's Task Force on United Nations Operations, which provides the Secretary-General with integrated policy advice, and maintain interdepartmental working groups, which are set up for particular United Nations operations.

15. As the instrument of peace-keeping has been utilized in recent years in conditions which are more demanding operationally than ever before, it is necessary to enhance the Secretariat's capacity for executive direction and management of such operations. In particular, the Secretariat must have a greater capacity to conduct feasibility studies of options for the consideration of the Security Council; to translate mandates into achievable concepts of operations; to provide timely guidance and support to the field as well as meaningful feedback to the Council; to develop and refine, on the basis of experience, doctrines, operational concepts, standard operating procedures and related common terminology for United Nations peace-keeping operations.

16. Comprehensive planning is required at United Nations Headquarters before missions are launched. This entails the need for a greater capacity within the Secretariat for contingency planning and large-scale logistics planning, geared to generic mission types; and, drawing on these efforts, pre-deployment planning for specific missions, involving to the extent feasible senior military and civilian officials and the core staff of field headquarters. While advances have been made to develop the Secretariat structure to meet these challenges, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations at current staffing levels continues to struggle to cope with day-to-day requirements.

17. During the planning phase preceding the actual establishment of a peace-keeping operation (and within the limits imposed by time and staffing constraints), the Secretariat has begun to hold informal meetings with potential troop contributors, thus providing an opportunity before a new operation is actually launched to provide those Governments with comprehensive information about operational plans and likely challenges, so that they may take these into account in deciding on their contribution to the operation.

18. These innovations aside, the Secretary-General and his colleagues will continue to be in constant formal and informal contact with both members of the Security Council and troop-contributing Governments and will do whatever is necessary to continue the existing practice of close consultations.

19. In the field, common sense and sound management practice dictate that the head of mission ensures that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents are concerned. Such involvement should take the form of consultations among professionals in a unified force. However, they cannot be allowed to develop into indirect negotiations with national headquarters, which

could impede action and undermine the willingness and vigour with which the orders of the United Nations are carried out.

20. The Governments contributing troops and other personnel to an operation have a natural and legitimate interest in satisfying themselves that their personnel are employed as effectively as possible, in accordance with the Security Council's mandate, and without exposing them to unnecessary risk. Similarly, they will form views regarding the course of action pursued in an operation, especially when it faces difficulties. The channel through which these views should be articulated, however, is United Nations Headquarters, in dialogue with the Secretariat, with other troop contributors and with the Security Council, rather than unilaterally through their contingent commanders.

VI. FORCES NOT UNDER DIRECT UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

21. In some cases in recent years when enforcement action was required, the Security Council, for a number of well-known reasons, has chosen not to intervene initially with a United Nations force. In the case of Somalia, the Council instead authorized a group of concerned and willing Member States to undertake military action, with the idea that this operation (the Unified Task Force) would be relieved after several months by a United Nations operation (UNOSOM II). Variations of this approach have since been utilized in Rwanda and Haiti and it is likely that they will be employed elsewhere in the future.

22. Experience to date has shown both the value of this approach and the difficulties inherent in it. Groups of Member States, engaging in military activities under a general mandate from the Security Council, can claim international legitimacy and approval for a range of actions which may in fact not have been envisaged by the Security Council. It therefore follows that peace enforcement operations by groups of Member States must be closely monitored by the Council if international acceptance of those actions and their consequences is to be assured. Otherwise, the United Nations might find itself compelled to assume great responsibilities for humanitarian and related operations in particularly inauspicious circumstances.

23. Issues of accountabiity and transparency are crucial when groups of Member States cooperate with the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter. For such cooperation to be effective new modalities for linkage to and review by the Security Council need to be devised.

24. In the last two years the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia has worked extensively with other organizations having related operational tasks and has gained experience with regard to the particular command and control challenges posed by such cooperation. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) carry out certain tasks authorized by the Security Council which UNPROFOR does not have either the mandate or the means to accomplish. These include NATO and WEU monitoring of the Adriatic and the Danube to ensure compliance with international sanctions, as well as NATO monitoring and enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. This type of cooperation is mutually beneficial and presents few serious problems with regard to command and control,

especially since the different organizations have discrete mandates and there is little or no overlap in their operations. In the case of the United Nations and the European Union, the creation of an institutional nexus in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has embodied the close cooperation of the two organizations.

25. Secondly, NATO provides air power for purposes authorized by the Security Council and in support of UNPROFOR. This innovation has brought up unprecedented issues of command and control, which have been the subject of intensive consultations between the United Nations and NATO, in the course of which much common ground has been found, in particular through a "dual key" arrangement in which both organizations must give prior approval of specific actions.

26. Thirdly, organizations may seek to accomplish tasks which are not authorized specifically by the Security Council but the execution of which requires the practical cooperation of United Nations forces on the ground. The primary example is NATO's enforcement of exclusion zones around "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in furtherance of the objectives of Security Council resolutions. While the two organizations are working towards common objectives, close cooperation is essential; in the absence of a precise agreement as to the circumstances justifying the use of force, each organization will wish to respond to its own priorities, which may be different from or in some respects even mutually exclusive of the aims of the other. NATO and WEU and the United Nations are seeking to build upon their joint experience so that modes of cooperation which by their very nature preclude smooth command and control arrangements may be taken into account in future cooperative endeavours.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

27. Effectiveness in command and control rests most obviously on the acceptance by troop contributors of the essential requirements of United Nations operational command and on the corresponding willingness to place adequately trained and equipped personnel under the authority of the United Nations commander. In an era of complex and sometimes risky operations, Governments' willingness to do so will hinge in part on their perception that the Security Council and the Secretary-General hear their views, take them into account and provide timely and meaningful information in return. The Secretary-General therefore looks forward to the further development of the consultative process.

28. The Secretariat's ability to provide peace-keeping operations with effective executive direction and control is crucial to an improved system of command and control and depends on enhanced resources, in particular staff resources at Headquarters. The Secretary-General shares in the general consensus that the Secretariat units directly involved in peace-keeping still need to be considerably strengthened. Such strengthening would give the Organization the capacity to direct and support its peace-keeping operations at a level commensurate with their important and often dangerous tasks in what essentially is a common endeavour to formulate and implement the will of the international community.

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PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith lists of Azerbaijani children being held hostage in the Republic of Armenia and in Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani territory. The lists were given to you by the Azerbaijani League for the Protection of Children's Rights at the time of your meeting with refugees in Baku (see annex). On behalf of the Government of the Azerbaijani Republic, I request that you use every possible effort to ensure their speedy release.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the lists contained in its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 101, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eldar KULIYEV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

A. List of Azerbaijani children taken hostage by the Armenian side

(as at 1 October 1994)

No.	Family name, first name, patronymic	Date of birth	Place taken hostage	Place of birth
1.	Abdulov, Zakhid Elman	1977	Khojaly	Khojaly
2.	Abysheva, Medina Ali	1985	Khojaly	Khojaly
3.	Abysheva, Chinara Kyazim	1982	Khojaly	Khojaly
4.	Abyshev, Fikret Nerje	1970	Agdam	Sabirabad
5.	Abyshev, Chingiz Nazim	1981	Khojaly	Khojaly
6.	Agayarov, Nabi Isak	1981	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
7.	Agayarov, Raman Isag	1983	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
8.	Agayarova, Sevinj Isag	1980	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
9.	Aliyev, Habib Alibala	1977	Hankendi	Vilyasuvar
10.	Aliyev, Zaur Hasan	1983	Shusha	Gazakh
11.	Aliyev, Tair Sabir	1988	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
12.	Aliyev, Talekh Valekh	1981	Fizuli	Fizuli
13.	Aliyev, Elgiz Firdovsi	1984	Khojaly	Khojaly
14.	Aliyev, Elchin Firdovsi	1982	Khojaly	Khojaly
15.	Aliyeva, G. Sabir	1982	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
16.	Alysheva, Vasilya Jafar	1979	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
17.	Amiraliyev, Shakhriyar Hasay	1988	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
18.	Amiraliyev, Elmdar Hasay	1982	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
19.	Amiraliyeva, Gyunesh Mamed	1977	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
20.	Aslanova, Elnara Tofik	1977	Khojaly	Khojaly
21.	Aliyev, Mushfig Nadir	1978	-	Kelbajar
22.	Akhmedov, Rafik Kerim	1977	-	Agdam
23.	Akhmedov, Seimur Niyaz	1980	Khojaly	-
24.	Akhmedov, Elbrus Niyaz	1978	Khojavend	-
25.	Akhmedov, Yasin Elchin	1977	Agdam	Agdam
26.	Bagirov, Elshad Matlyab	1976	Gubadly	Lachin
27.	Bandaliyev, Khayal Elbrus	1986	Kelbajar	Mingechevir
28.	Gambarov, Emil Safar	1986	Khojaly	Khojaly
29.	Gambarova, Esmira Safar	1987	Khojaly	Khojaly
30.	Karaev, Bashir Hazanfar	1976	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
31.	Hasanov, Anar Aslan	1976	Lachin	-
32.	Hasymov, Idris Bakhtiyar	1984	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
33.	Hasymov, Nureddin Mikail	1976	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
34.	Hojaev, Anar Aslan	1978	Lachin	Lachin
35.	Guliyev, Zireddin Ziyad	1978	Fizuli	Fizuli
36.	Guliyev, Khurram Mekhtigulu	1983	Fizuli	Fizuli
37.	Guliyev, Shukyur Garayagdy	1980	Khojaly	Khojaly
38.	Guliyeva, Jeikhune Mekhtigulu	1987	Fizuli	Djebrail
39.	Guliyeva, Nurana Garayagdy	1979	Khojaly	Khojaly
40.	Guliyeva, Ravane Garayagdy	1976	Khojaly	Khojaly

No.	Family name, first name, patronymic	Date of birth	Place taken hostage	Place of birth
41.	Guliyev, Mazakhir Gara	1982	-	Kelbajar
42.	Gurbanova, Rovshana Firudin	1992	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
43.	Huseinov, Elgyun Elkhan	1991	Khojaly	Khojaly
44.	Huseinov, Emil Elkhan	1989	Khojaly	Khojaly
45.	Huseinova, Shabnam Elkhan	1987	Khojaly	Khojaly
46.	Zeinalov, Javad Jabbar	1979	-	Baku
47.	Zeinalov, Jeikhun Javanshir	1976	Khojavend	-
48.	Zeinalov, Fyriz Davud	1983	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
49.	Ibadov, Natik Manaf	1977	Agdam	Agdam
50.	Ibadov, Niyametdin Manaf	1980	-	-
51.	Ibishov, Halib Madat	1977	Lachin	Lachin
52.	Ilyasov, Babek Hasan	1992	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
53.	Iskenderov, Rasim Yolchu	1976	Djebrail	Djebrail
54.	Ismailov, Telman Zeinal	1976	-	Khanlar
55.	Kyazimov, Gabil Akper	1980	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
56.	Kyazimov, Gadir Akper	1978	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
57.	Kyazimov, Ruslan Akper	1976	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
58.	Kyazimova, Samira Akper	1984	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
59.	Kyazimova, Shakhla Alekper	1979	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
60.	Mamedov, Niyameddin Vagif	1979	Askeran	Khojaly
61.	Mejnunova, Sakina Izzet	1985	Gubadly	Gubadly
62.	Mirzoev, Rizvan Bilal	1976	Shusha	Yardymly
63.	Muradov, Elshan Abdulsamed	1977	Terter	Imishli
64.	Nurullaev, Revshan Abdulla	1976	Terter	Khachmaz
65.	Orujev, Javan Javan	1976	Khojaly	Baku
66.	Orujeva, Melek Ali	1976	-	-
67.	Orujeva, Natavan Nabi	1990	-	-
68.	Ragimov, Vagif Sadri	1980	Zangelan	Saatly
69.	Ragimov, Hasan Tofik	1976	-	Alibayramly
70.	Safarov, Zabil Kyamran	1979	Kelbajar	Kelbajar
71.	Soltanov, Samir Nurbala	1976	-	Guba

B. List of Azerbaijani children taken hostage whose place of detention is known

No.	Family name, first name, patronymic	Date of birth	Place of birth	Place of detention
In Armenia				
1.	Aliyev, Zaur Hasan	1983	Gazakh	Noemberyan
2.	Guliyev, Ziraddin Ziyad	1978	Fizuli	Erevan
3.	Aliyev, Takhir Sabir	1988	Kelbajar	Goris
4.	Ilyasov, Babek Hasan	1992	Kelbajar	Goris
5.	Mamedov, Niyameddin Vagif	1979	Khojaly	Spitak

No.	Family name, first name, patronymic	Date of birth	Place of birth	Place of detention
In Upper Karabakh				
1.	Abdulov, Zakhid Elman	1977	Khojaly	Askeran
2.	Aliyev, Talekh Valekh	1981	Fizuli	Hadrut
3.	Aliyev, Mushfig Nadir	1978	Kelbajar	Hankendi
4.	Guliyev, Mazakhir Gara	1982	Kelbajar	Hankendi
5.	Ragimov, Vagif Sadri	1980	Saatly	Hadrut
6.	Safarov, Zabil Kyamran	1978	Kelbajar	Hankendi

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21 November 1994

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Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 37 (b)

STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

International cooperation and assistance to alleviate the consequences of war in Croatia and to facilitate its recovery

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/204 of 21 December 1993, entitled "International cooperation and assistance to alleviate the consequences of war in Croatia and to facilitate its recovery". In that resolution the General Assembly, noting the continuous efforts of the Government of Croatia to solve the problems of post-war reconstruction and, at the same time, to solve the existing problems of refugees, displaced persons and victims of war within Croatia, and recognizing the importance of the United Nations overall humanitarian effort in Croatia, in particular its involvement in specific actions aimed at transforming humanitarian relief into longer-term development projects, reaffirmed its appeal to all States, regional, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other relevant bodies to provide cooperation in various forms and special and other assistance, in particular in the most severely affected areas and with a view to facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to those areas.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, taking into account the circumstances in the region, to carry out, in cooperation with the Government of Croatia, an assessment of needs for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of Croatia and to launch, if appropriate, an international appeal for the funding of a programme for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

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3. On 11 May 1994, the United Nations launched a revised consolidated inter-agency appeal for the former Yugoslavia for the period from July to December 1994. In the foreword by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for Refugees the appeal foresaw continued need for relief assistance but in circumstances where positive developments allowed a shift from dependency to self-sufficiency. The appeal included requests for funding for programmes to be executed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. The United Nations Inter-agency Working Group met on 20 July at Geneva to review the progress of the programmes and the funding status, and again in September 1994 to review the situation and prospects for 1995.

4. The appeal was based on the findings of an inter-agency mission undertaken in March 1994 and included a request for funding to assist the Government of Croatia in providing services to the refugees and displaced persons on its territory, which are estimated to number 637,000, including those in the United Nations Protected Areas. In addition, a total of over 375,000 Croatian citizens applied for assistance through the Croatian Ministry of Labour as at February 1994. The appeal was revised on 1 September 1994 in view of significant changes that had taken place over the summer months. The revised appeal reflected a notable decrease in the number of beneficiaries (490,000) following a census conducted by the Government of Croatia. That population is receiving assistance mainly from the European Community Task Force and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

5. International assistance to Croatia is therefore aimed mainly at assisting with the basic needs of the large population of refugees and displaced persons as well as those affected by the economic effects of the war in the region. The full start of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in many areas has been hampered by the lack of a comprehensive political solution to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and, in particular, the situation in the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia. However, as the foreword of the inter-agency appeal indicates, relief activities are being integrated into medium- and long-term developmental programmes, especially in the areas of health, sanitation, shelter, education, community services and other social needs.

6. In that context, the organizations of the United Nations system have developed, in cooperation with the Government of Croatia, several programmes aimed at rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

7. UNDP has developed a project financed from indicative planning figure resources to enhance the aid coordination mechanisms of the Government, in order to integrate better the national and international reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. The UNDP/Department for Development Support and Management Services formulation mission that developed the project proposal

reviewed, with the Croatian authorities, different components of a reconstruction and rehabilitation programme and identified areas for future projects.

8. In the United Nations Protected Area - Sector West, a UNDP/Department for Development Support and Management Services pilot project of social reconstruction is being carried out by the United Nations Office at Vienna. The objectives of the project are to ease social tensions in that war-torn region and to assist with the revitalization of socio-economic action schemes.

9. A programme for the socio-economic recovery for the southern Dalmatian coast, particularly the area around Dubrovnik, has been prepared and an investment promotion exercise, together with UNIDO, is under consideration.

10. UNIDO has been active in Croatia in the promotion of timber-frame housing construction and revival of the building industry in Vinkovci, Slavonski Brod and Virovitica, as well as prevention of industry pollution due to war damages.

11. The Department for Development Support and Management Services is now establishing a Reconstruction and Development Support Unit at the United Nations Office at Vienna. The Unit will implement social welfare programmes in areas of conflict, multisectoral pilot reconstruction projects and post-war economic recovery programmes. It will seek third-party resources to help finance those programmes.

12. The enhancement of the coordinating capacity of the Government of Croatia, supported by a United Nations mission to assess damages and needs for post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes, will form the basis of a funding appeal to address the developmental needs of Croatia. It is clear, however, that the full implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes is closely linked to a successful conclusion of current efforts aimed at finding a comprehensive political settlement.

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Forty-ninth session
Agenda items 107 and 112

PROGRAMME BUDGET FOR THE BIENNIUM 1994-1995

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Programme budget implications of the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in its report (A/49/673, para. 5)

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Larbi DJACTA (Algeria)

1. At its 21st meeting, on 21 November 1994, the Fifth Committee, pursuant to rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, considered the statement by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/49/31) on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 5 of its report (A/49/673). The related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions was presented orally by the Chairman of the Fifth Committee.

2. Statements and comments made in the course of the Committee's consideration of this item are reflected in the relevant summary record (A/C.5/49/SR.21).

DECISION OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

3. The Fifth Committee decided, without a vote, to inform the General Assembly that, should it adopt the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 5 of its report (A/49/673), no additional appropriation would be required in the programme budget for the biennium 1994-1995.

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S/1994/1330
22 November 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 51
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter dated 21 November 1994 sent to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with a previous letter addressed to you by Mr. Glafcos Clerides, leader of the Greek Cypriot community, which was circulated in the annex to General Assembly and Security Council document A/49/648-S/1994/1263 dated 8 November 1994.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its enclosure could be circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Appendix

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Rauf Denktas to the Secretary-General

It was not my intention to write you a letter following the informal consultations between 18 and 31 October 1994, but after having read Mr. Clerides' letter to you of 8 November 1994, which has been circulated as a United Nations document (A/49/648-S/1994/1263, annex), I felt that there was now a need to do so in order to set the record right.

I was disappointed to observe that the Greek Cypriot side had taken initiatives, following the conclusion of the informal consultations, which cannot be compatible with the wish and vision of peace, stability, welfare and cooperation that we envisage within the context of a partnership solution. I firmly believe that, as the leaders of the two communities destined to share the same homeland, Mr. Clerides and I should first respect each other and work towards creating an environment of mutual trust and confidence compatible with the above wish. This being so, I wish to assure you that it is not my intention in this letter to vilify the Greek Cypriot side or its distinguished leader, but to brief you directly on the views I expressed and the suggestions I made during the informal consultations.

As you are no doubt aware, immediately after receipt of your letter of 10 October 1994, I informed your Deputy Special Representative in Cyprus that I was ready and willing to engage in this historic mission. I made my preparations for the consultations on the basis of your suggestion that we should hold "a number of informal consultations ... with a view to exploring in a practical and concrete manner ways in which progress might be made both in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures and the long-contemplated overall settlement of the Cyprus problem".

I took this suggestion as an indication of the agenda at the consultations, or at least, as a guidance to the subjects to be discussed.

In our first meeting I tried to set a conciliatory tone for the consultations and explained to Mr. Clerides that the Cyprus question had come to a turning-point that we must both be aware of our historic duties and responsibilities. I pointed out that we were both approaching the end of our political lives and that our peoples and the international community were expecting a breakthrough from us. I stressed that your invitation for informal consultations provided us with a rare opportunity to realize this breakthrough.

During the consultations I especially emphasized the need to explore, in a practical and concrete manner, ways in which progress might be made in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures package. I did this because I fully share your assessment set out in paragraph 63 of your report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830), where you stress that: "It appears from the recent joint meetings that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails."

Furthermore, the subject of exploring ways through which the confidence-building measures package might be implemented was the first of the two subjects you suggested we discuss, during the consultations, in your letter of 10 October 1994.

I made it abundantly clear during the consultations that, based on your repeated assessments, we had to immediately address the issue of trust and confidence if we were to expect any successful outcome to the talks on the long-contemplated overall settlement, and frequently reminded Mr. Clerides that I was ready and willing to conclude the confidence-building measures agreement to achieve that objective. I pointed out during the consultations that the signing of the confidence-building measures agreement and its implementation would enable us to overcome the obstacle put in our way by the European Court of Justice ruling. I also stated during the consultations that I am prepared to accept the procedure you have suggested for the implementation of the confidence-building measures package in the report contained in your letter of 28 June 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council. I specifically stressed that we had to benefit from the constructive evaluation in your above-stated letter where you say: "I concluded that there had now been sufficient progress for the United Nations to implement the package on the basis of the 21 March paper and subsequent clarifications." I went as far as saying that this was the first time in the post-1974 phase of the 31-year-old crisis in Cyprus when the two sides had the chance and opportunity of concluding an agreement that would contain practical elements and would be implemented. I pleaded that this opportunity should not be missed.

When Mr. Clerides said during the consultations that he had problems of access to the fenced area of Varosha within the context of the United Nations-negotiated confidence-building measures, I made a proposal to him that entailed further sacrifices for the Turkish Cypriot community. I am confident that this proposal has been duly noted by your representatives in Cyprus. The response of Mr. Clerides was that he did not want to discuss the confidence-building measures until after a settlement.

As per the second request contained in your letter of 10 October 1994, I also engaged in consultations with Mr. Clerides regarding the issues of an overall settlement. In view of Mr. Clerides' refusal to discuss the confidence-building measures package until after a settlement, I likewise could have said that I, in turn, did not wish to discuss issues of the federal settlement until after an agreement on the confidence-building measures. I did not, however, take this negative stand.

At the initial stage of our consultations regarding an overall settlement, I reminded Mr. Clerides of the assessment of your Special Representative Mr. Joe Clark, following his latest visit, which he later reiterated during the press interview following his meeting with the Security Council on 10 October 1994, that we were approaching a kind of impasse in Cyprus and that this had two main reasons: (a) the European Court of Justice ruling of 5 July 1994; and (b) the resolution of the Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of 28 August 1994. I repeatedly reconfirmed to Mr. Clerides that our objective for a negotiated settlement and for the negotiation process had not changed; that this objective was the realization of a bi-communal and

bi-zonal federal solution; and that the second obstacle pointed out by Mr. Joe Clark for a negotiated settlement did not therefore, really exist.

I explained to Mr. Clerides that I was prepared to engage in a process of give-and-take, like the concept of "horse trading" suggested by your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel, and that in order to realize the above-mentioned objective we had to approach the subject within the context of the following headings: constitutional aspects, displaced persons, security and guarantees and territorial adjustments. In line with this approach I made the bold and creative suggestions to Mr. Clerides that we could work on the basis of such formulas as "land for peace" and "land for a viable solution". I am sure you will appreciate that these suggestions provide a significant opening for a negotiated settlement.

I have noted the confirmation of your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel that during the consultations Mr. Clerides has accepted the Turkish Cypriot definition of limited sovereignty based on the Swiss model, namely that: "The federated States are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution."

Mr. Clerides' acceptance of the above definition of sovereignty, however, is conditional on the Turkish Cypriot side's acceptance to support as from now the unilateral application for European Union (EU) membership submitted in 1990 by the Greek Cypriot Administration under the title of "the Government of the Republic of Cyprus", with the proviso that, if accepted, it would be the "Federal Republic of Cyprus" which would enter the EU. This condition, unfortunately, entails legal, political and economic difficulties and complications which have already been explained in detail during the consultations and which make the practicality of this offer impossible.

As an alternative approach, I proposed to Mr. Clerides that if we realized our objective of establishing the federation, I would go along with the provision laid down in the "Set of Ideas" regarding the EU membership of the Federal Republic, as agreed to by both myself and Mr. Vassiliou. Paragraph 92 of the "Set of Ideas" lays down that: "Matters related to the membership of the Federal Republic in the European Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referendums."

I reconfirmed at the consultations that I would also go along with the provisions of the "Set of Ideas" regarding the demilitarization of the Federal Republic and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces.

I repeatedly stressed that the implementation of the confidence-building measures package would generate an environment of trust and confidence that, in turn, would facilitate the establishment of the federal government.

In order to remove the suspicion of the Greek Cypriot side that after the conclusion of the confidence-building measures agreement we would no longer be interested in an overall settlement, I proposed to Mr. Clerides that we both commit ourselves to commence negotiations on an overall settlement on the day the confidence-building measures agreement is endorsed by the Security Council.

As proof of our sincerity in and commitment to a negotiated settlement, I made the following concrete proposal to Mr. Clerides on 31 October 1994 in respect of both the confidence-building measures and an overall settlement:

"(a) The two leaders have agreed on the package of confidence-building measures. They have decided to sign the agreement on ... (date). (Let us fix a date in November.)

"(b) The two leaders have decided to commence talks between the two sides, on the date the Security Council endorses the confidence-building measures agreement and in accordance with the 'integrated whole' principle, with a view to attaining a comprehensive settlement on a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal basis.

"(c) The two leaders have decided to establish a committee of experts, with a view to concluding the procedures relating to the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures.

"(d) It is envisaged that the confidence-building measures committee concludes its work within 15 days.

"(e) At the same time, it has been decided that a committee of experts be established for the purpose of evaluating the views of the two sides on a comprehensive settlement put forward during the informal consultations between the two leaders.

"(f) It is envisaged that the comprehensive settlement committee submits a progress report within one month.

"(g) The two leaders have decided to come together in some 15 days, under the auspices of Mr. Feissel, in order to review the results, upon the completion of the work by the confidence-building measures committee, and to conclude the preparatory work on the confidence-building measures agreement."

I very well know that you will be evaluating my consultations with Mr. Clerides, on the basis of the report that you will be getting from your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel. I want to stress again, however, that the modalities for the implementation of the confidence-building measures, as such, were not in fact taken up during the consultations and that reference during the consultations to this matter was limited only to instances when I invited and reminded Mr. Clerides that we also needed to discuss the package.

The points and positions I have outlined in this letter are from talking points of the consultations which I have already handed to your Deputy Special Representative Mr. Feissel. I had requested Mr. Feissel to give a copy of the talking points of our meeting of 31 October 1994 to Mr. Clerides. I am confident that these talking points have been brought to your attention.

In conclusion, I wish to confirm that I continue to support your mission of good offices; that I am prepared and willing to sign the confidence-building measures agreement; that I believe that the implementation of the confidence-

building measures agreement would help in facilitating an overall solution; that we are fully committed to a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal solution; and that I am always available and prepared to engage in face-to-face negotiations with Mr. Clerides.

In this connection, I wish to assure you that the Turkish Cypriot side does have the political will and readiness to reach a negotiated settlement with the Greek Cypriot side and to bring an equitable solution and lasting peace to both peoples of our beautiful island.

Thank you again for your kind assistance.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

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22 November 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 79
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 November 1994, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 21 November 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

With reference to a statement made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the meeting of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) on 17 November 1994, on agenda item 79, entitled "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects", I have the honour to bring to your kind attention the following in exercise of my right of reply which I can only present in writing due to reasons that are well known.

It is ironic that, in that statement, Mr. Shambos sheds crocodile tears on "casualties suffered by peace-keepers in 1974" at a time when Greek Cypriot schoolchildren and others, at the instigation and encouragement of his own leadership, are busy attacking and injuring United Nations peace-keepers in violent demonstrations along the buffer zone and our borders. As you are aware, in the massive demonstrations that were staged on 15 November 1994, two United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) personnel were injured by the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, along with Turkish Cypriot civilians and a number of military personnel, as also stated by the United Nations spokesman on peace-keeping operations at the noon briefing on the same date.

The demonstrations have again shown which side harbours deep-seated hostility and aggressive intentions against the other, and who has been on the defensive in Cyprus since the beginning of the conflict in 1963. I believe that Mr. Shambos does a disservice not only to the cause of a negotiated peace in Cyprus, but also to the memory of his own late leader, Archbishop Makarios, by trying to deny or ignore the following passages from his statement made before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, in which he unequivocally named Greece, and not Turkey, as the invader and the aggressor in Cyprus:

> "It is clearly an invasion from outside, in flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The so-called coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing and commanding the National Guard." (emphasis added) (Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, 1780th meeting, para. 18)

> "As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks." (emphasis added) (ibid., para. 32)

It is clear from the above that the events in which some United Nations peace-keepers lost their lives in the line of duty, both during the events of 1974 and before then, were caused by the Greek Cypriot side. The responsibility for such tragic loss of life, therefore, solely rests on the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot side, and whoever may have aided and abetted them in the bloody campaign to achieve enosis, union with Greece. It is also not forgotten that

numerous United Nations soldiers were murdered in cold blood by the Greek Cypriots between 1963 and 1974, allegedly for helping the then beleaguered Turkish Cypriots.

Despite the lack of any formal legal framework between the Turkish Cypriot side and UNFICYP, our side has always given its consent to the deployment and functioning of UNFICYP on its territory and has always cooperated with it in the performance of its duties. It is the Greek Cypriot side, which, contrary to its public posture, has again been creating immense difficulties for UNFICYP in maintaining the status quo, most notably by staging violent demonstrations and violations of the buffer zone such as the above, unnecessarily raising tensions in the island and also putting new strains on the process of peacemaking within the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. This fact is indicative of the Greek Cypriot side's two-faced approach to the negotiations and its lack of political will to settle the issue.

I would be grateful if the present letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Forty-ninth session
Agenda items 127 and 130

FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA

FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Larbi DJACTA (Algeria)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 23 September 1994, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its forty-ninth session the items entitled "Financing of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda" and "Financing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" and to allocate them to the Fifth Committee.

2. For its consideration of the items, the Committee had before it the reports of the Secretary-General (A/49/375 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/49/501).

3. The Fifth Committee considered the items at its 8th and 21st meetings, on 21 October and 21 November 1994. Statements and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the items are reflected in the relevant summary records (A/C.5/49/SR.8 and 21).

II. CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.5/49/L.5

4. At the 21st meeting, on 21 November 1994, the representative of Mexico introduced a draft resolution entitled "Financing of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda" (A/C.5/49/L.5).

5. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.5/49/L.5 without a vote (see para. 6).

III. RECOMMENDATION OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

6. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Financing of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 1/ and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, 2/

Recalling Security Council resolutions 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993 and 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council established, respectively, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, as well as resolutions 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994 and 928 (1994) of 20 June 1994 by which the Council further renewed the mandates of the Assistance Mission and the Observer Mission, respectively,

Recalling also its resolution 48/245 of 5 April 1994 on the financing of the Observer Mission, and its resolution 48/248 of 5 April 1994 and decisions 48/479 A of 23 December 1993 and 48/479 B of 14 September 1994, on the financing of the Assistance Mission,

Reaffirming that the costs of the Observer Mission and the Assistance Mission are expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its previous decisions regarding the fact that, in order to meet the expenditures caused by the Observer Mission and the Assistance Mission, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations,

Taking into account the fact that the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards such operations,

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1/ A/49/375 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

2/ A/49/501.

Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the States permanent members of the Security Council, as indicated in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, in the financing of such operations,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Observer Mission and the Assistance Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda and to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda as at 31 October 1994, including the contributions outstanding in the amounts of 670,906 United States dollars for the Observer Mission and 17,648,382 dollars for the Assistance Mission, and urges all Member States concerned to make every possible effort to ensure the payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

2. Expresses concern about the financial situation with regard to peace-keeping activities, particularly as regards the reimbursement of troop contributors, due to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments, particularly Member States in arrears;

3. Urges all Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Observer Mission and to the Assistance Mission promptly and in full;

4. Endorses the observations and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, 2/ subject to the provisions of the present resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Assistance Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

6. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda a total amount of 163,101,700 United States dollars gross (161,515,400 dollars net) for the operation of the Assistance Mission for the period from 5 April to 9 December 1994, inclusive of the amount of 57,063,960 dollars gross (55,812,760 dollars net) authorized under the provisions of General Assembly resolution 48/248;

7. Decides also, as an ad hoc arrangement, to apportion the additional amount of 100,744,440 dollars gross (100,542,240 dollars net) for the period from 5 April to 9 December 1994, taking into account the amount of 62,357,260 dollars gross (60,973,160 dollars net) already apportioned in accordance with General Assembly resolution 48/248, among Member States in accordance with the composition of groups set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Assembly resolution 43/232 of 1 March 1989, as adjusted by the Assembly in its resolutions 44/192 B of 21 December 1989, 45/269 of 27 August 1991, 46/198 A of 20 December 1991 and 47/218 A of 23 December 1992, and its decision 48/472 A of 23 December 1993, and taking into account the scale of assessments for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994

as set out in Assembly resolutions 46/221 A of 20 December 1991 and 48/223 A of 23 December 1993, and Assembly decision 47/456 of 23 December 1992;

8. Decides further that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 7 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of the estimated additional staff assessment income of 202,200 dollars approved for the Assistance Mission for the period from 5 April to 9 December 1994;

9. Decides that there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 7 above, their respective share in the unencumbered balances of 1,288,200 dollars gross (1,258,900 dollars net) in respect of the Observer Mission for the period from 22 June to 21 December 1993 and 10,531,600 dollars gross (10,633,200 dollars net) in respect of the Assistance Mission for the period from 5 October 1993 to 4 April 1994;

10. Decides also, with regard to the period beyond 9 December 1994, to authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for a four-month period, at a monthly rate not to exceed 15 million dollars gross, in connection with the maintenance of the Assistance Mission (provided that any amount above 10.5 million dollars per month should be designated for military personnel costs and specifically justified to the General Assembly through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), the amount of 30 million dollars to be assessed, in accordance with the scheme set out in the present resolution, subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Assistance Mission beyond 9 December 1994;

11. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with respect to the recommendations made by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 26 of its report, to maintain the positions of Senior Political Adviser and Assistant to the Senior Political Adviser;

12. Invites the Secretary-General to adjust as may be required by the changing nature of the Assistance Mission the staffing levels, especially those relating to Humanitarian Assistance Officers, if necessary, within existing staffing levels;

13. Decides to undertake, beginning on 28 February 1995, a detailed review of the financing of the Assistance Mission for the period 10 December 1994 to 9 June 1995 and of the performance report contained in the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General, 3/ and requests the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee to arrange their work programmes so as to ensure that the appropriate budget estimates and reports are available to Member States no later than 20 February 1995;

14. Expresses its deep concern that the contract for services to the Assistance Mission has been renewed without international competitive bidding as outlined in paragraphs 40 to 44 of the report of the Advisory Committee; 2/

3/ A/49/375/Add.1.

15. Urges the Secretary-General to obtain as soon as possible all contractual services for the Assistance Mission through international competitive bidding in order to award all those services to the lowest acceptable bidder in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations, and requests him to present, in the context of his submission of the next budget proposals, substantial written explanations for granting the exceptions to the rule of international competitive bidding;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to present, for its consideration at the current regular session, information pertaining to the question of procurement of contractual services for peace-keeping operations and an initial explanation of the reasons for granting any exception to financial rule 110.18 regarding the provision of those services in the course of the execution of a number of peace-keeping operations since January 1994, in order to allow the Assembly to take appropriate and prompt action in this regard;

17. Invites voluntary contributions to the Assistance Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure established by the General Assembly in its resolutions 43/230 of 21 December 1988, 44/192 A of 21 December 1989 and 45/258 of 3 May 1991;

18. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Financing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda".

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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE, NORMALCY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-STRICKEN AFGHANISTAN

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 48/208, which was adopted without a vote on 21 December 1993. In that resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General:

(a) To dispatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a United Nations special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leaders of Afghanistan, soliciting their views on how the United Nations can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, and to submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary-General for appropriate action;

(b) To develop the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation, prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), into a full-scale strategy for rehabilitation and reconstruction, based on an in-country assessment by a team of experts of the war damage and destruction;

(c) To initiate, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, a plan for mobilizing financial, technical and material assistance, including the possibility of convening a conference of donor States and international financial institutions.

2. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the overall situation in Afghanistan and make available his good offices.

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3. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its forty-ninth session on the progress made in the implementation of the resolution. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. THE SPECIAL MISSION AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION

4. In accordance with operative paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 48/208, on 11 February 1994 I appointed Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, to head the special mission to Afghanistan. Mr. Mestiri submitted his progress report to me in June, and this was subsequently issued in document A/49/208-S/1994/766. The present report covers the work of the special mission since that progress report.

5. The Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan, headed by my Personal Representative, Mr. Sotirios Mousouris, continued to monitor the overall situation in Afghanistan. Mr. Mousouris remained Deputy Head of the special mission.

A. National rapprochement

1. The second phase

6. On 22 July 1994, the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan began the second phase of its work, initiating in-depth and intensive consultations with representatives of the warring sides, leaders of the "neutral" parties, representatives of the Herat Gathering and other prominent Afghans, including the Governor of Ningarhar, Haji Kadir.

7. One side involved in the fighting is the Supreme Coordination Council, which is composed of four parties: Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan (Hekmatyar), the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Dostum), Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Afghanistan (Mazari) and the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Mojaddedi). The other side is a coalition of two parties supporting President Rabbani: Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan and Ittehad-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan. The leaders of the "neutral" parties at that time were Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani (National Islamic Front for Afghanistan), Ayatollah Asef Mohseini (Harakat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan) and Maulawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi (Harakat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan).

8. The Herat Gathering was convened in July 1994 by Governor Ismael Khan, an important leader of Jamiat-i-Islami, and produced a number of interesting conclusions regarding a solution to the conflict. The Gathering, however, was boycotted by most of the Afghan political parties.

9. The initial consultations of the special mission identified agreement, in principle, on three significant elements necessary to implement a comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan: a fully representative preparatory committee, transitional arrangements, and the convening of a Loya Jirga (grand assembly). These consultations also brought to light the need for, and the possibility of holding, a joint preliminary meeting of the warring parties in order to further the peace process.

10. With effect from 5 August 1994, therefore, the Head of the special mission focused his efforts on trying to bring together the warring parties. As these discussions progressed, the issue of the representation of General Dostum emerged as the principal point of contention. Despite the many compromise proposals and formulae that were suggested, it proved impossible to hold this preliminary meeting because of the refusal by certain parties to accept General Dostum's participation in it. As a result, the special mission held several separate meetings with representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council and neutral leaders on the one hand, and with representatives of President Rabbani, the Herat Gathering and the same neutral leaders, on the other.

11. At the end of this phase, on 2 September 1994, Mr. Mestiri stated that the inability of the warring parties to hold the joint preliminary meeting clearly indicated that the commitment to peace was not yet sufficiently strong or widespread to overcome the obstacles that are inherent in any negotiation process.

12. During my visit to Pakistan from 6 to 8 September 1994, I met separately with two of the neutral party leaders, with the representative of Mr. Rabbani, with the representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council and with independent Afghans. In a statement on 7 September, I noted with regret that the efforts to convene a joint meeting of the warring factions and leaders of the neutral parties had not been successful. The United Nations was not discouraged by this obstacle and would continue its efforts. Crucial to the success of the peace process was the involvement of all segments of the Afghan population, including independent groups and "personalities". All Afghan leaders, particularly those involved in the conflict, must heed the overwhelming desire for peace expressed by the Afghan people and cooperate with the United Nations special mission in the search for a lasting cease-fire and a fully representative national political process. This was an opportunity that should not be missed. The United Nations was ready to assist the Afghan people in emerging from fratricidal conflict and curbing unwarranted foreign interference in their internal affairs. I also called on all countries to continue their support of the United Nations in this regard.

13. On 8 September 1994, I instructed the Head of the special mission to take the steps necessary to convene a meeting of independent Afghan personalities, including intellectuals, religious leaders, former ministers, commanders and others inside and outside Afghanistan, for the purpose of advising the United Nations on how to help bring peace to Afghanistan. Many of these Afghans, despite having been excluded from the political process or marginalized at its edge, were none the less recognized and respected by the vast majority of the Afghan people.

14. This advisory group was intended to bring into the political process moderate and constructive actors, who would be seen by the Afghan people as capable of representing their views and whom it would be impossible for the political leaders to reject. The advisory group could help to break the present stalemate, thus making it possible to move beyond old formulae that had been tried without success and to produce ideas for peace, which would be viewed as non-partisan.

2. The third phase: the Quetta process

15. The Head of the special mission initiated the first meeting of the advisory group on 29 September 1994, at Quetta, Pakistan. The meetings lasted 19 days, ending on 17 October. The group, initially composed of some 20 people, was later doubled on the recommendation of its members so as to take better account of the geographical and ethnic balance of Afghanistan, thereby strengthening its representative nature. Almost all of the additional advisers came from inside Afghanistan, many of them being military leaders. This expansion added further credibility to the group's recommendations.

16. The advisory group established three subcommittees: political, cease-fire and security. Each prepared a report which was adopted by the plenary of the advisory group. These reports identified the basic causes of the conflict in an impartial manner and outlined non-partisan proposals for solutions to it.

The report of the political subcommittee

17. The political subcommittee focused on the following aspects of the Afghan conflict: external factors, internal realities and circumstances and the formation of a transitional government. Regarding the formation of a transitional government, the political subcommittee concentrated, inter alia, on its legitimacy, its composition, its responsibilities and authority, and its duration. The advisory group felt that the quickest way to establish a transitional government would be for an authoritative council, composed of the warring parties, neutral parties, and independent personalities, to appoint it directly.

The report of the cease-fire subcommittee

18. The cease-fire subcommittee emphasized the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. It argued that the proposed cease-fire should be based on an agreement between the warring parties that would be brokered by the United Nations. Its central elements would be as follows:

(a) The cease-fire should be unconditional and country-wide;

(b) Roads and highways should be opened to the public, and all illegal check-points should be removed throughout the country;

(c) Kabul and its suburbs should be demilitarized, and all armed forces from these areas should be evacuated and heavy weapons collected.

The report of the security subcommittee

19. The security subcommittee called for the formation of a security force (initially for Kabul), which it believed to be essential for the survival of the transitional government and the maintenance of a cease-fire. The security force for Kabul would number 20,000 (including officers, professional personnel, troops and support staff). The subcommittee suggested that all expenses and financial requirements of the force be borne by the international community, through the United Nations. The subcommittee felt that the force could become

the nucleus of a national army. (While undertaking the commitment of the United Nations to the peace process in Afghanistan, the special mission, of course, entered into no commitment regarding financial support for the security force.)

Political contacts

20. The Quetta process also included discussions with the representatives of the warring parties, who met not only with the special mission but also with its Afghan advisers. In these meetings, the Afghan advisers often challenged the basic assumptions that the warring parties had used to justify their positions with regard to the conflict. During this period, the Head of the special mission received an important communication from Mr. Rabbani expressing his readiness for a transfer of power through a mechanism which would prevent his opponents from taking advantage of it. This represented a significant advance from his position during the second phase. The Head of the special mission was able to use this to further his efforts to develop a mechanism for a transfer of power and a cease-fire.

21. Towards the end of the meeting at Quetta, the special mission and some of the Afghan advisers met with representatives of the warring sides and the neutral parties. In these discussions, the Head of the special mission focused on Mr. Rabbani's message and, in particular, on the practicalities of a transfer of power and a lasting cease-fire. He also discussed the establishment of a security force. The framework emerging from the Quetta process and the United Nations discussions with the parties made it possible to develop concrete United Nations proposals which offered a way of breaking the present stalemate. In addition, the Quetta process helped further to mobilize Afghan public opinion in support of the United Nations peace efforts.

22. The main feature of the United Nations proposals is the establishment of an authoritative council to serve as a decision-making forum. It would be composed of representatives of the warring factions, neutral parties and independent "personalities" and would create a transitional government, oversee a permanent cease-fire and establish a neutral security force. It could also itself be the recipient of the transfer of power.

3. Efforts after Quetta

23. Once the Quetta process was completed, the Head of the special mission travelled to Afghanistan to meet the leaders of the warring parties and discuss with them how the above-mentioned proposals could be put into effect. He met Mr. Rabbani twice at Jalalabad, on 18 and 19 October 1994. Mr. Rabbani accepted, in principle, the idea of the authoritative council and reiterated his readiness to step down. But he needed to study the details of the proposals further and to consult with his allies. The Head of the special mission also met Mr. Rabbani with Mr. Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi and Mr. Akbari (leader of a breakaway faction of Hezb-i-Wahdat) and emphasized that all sides in the fighting, including General Dostum, had to be represented in the political process if the goal of ending the fighting was to be achieved. The following day, the Head of the special mission met the same interlocutors in the presence of some of the Afghan advisers.

24. Several days later, he travelled from Jalalabad to Naghlu (60 kilometres south-east of Kabul), where he met with Mr. Hekmatyar and his senior advisers and discussed with them in detail, in the presence of the Afghan advisers, the proposals he had submitted to Mr. Rabbani. Mr. Hekmatyar agreed that a council should be formed immediately, to be made up of the warring sides, neutral parties and independent "personalities", though he combined these last two into one group. He agreed that power should be transferred either to the council or to a transitional government and that a permanent cease-fire should be established, roads opened and Kabul demilitarized. He linked the cease-fire to the transfer of power.

25. After these meetings with Mr. Hekmatyar, the Head of the special mission travelled to Jabal-seraj (70 kilometres north of Kabul), where he met General Ahmad Shah Massoud (the leading military personality in the Rabbani alliance). General Massoud said that he was ready for an unconditional cease-fire whenever the United Nations said it should go into effect. He supported in principle the idea of a council composed of the warring parties, neutral parties and independent personalities. He also supported the inclusion of more independent personalities. He said he would consult with other Jamiat officials about the details of the United Nations proposals. He agreed that the first step of a political process had to be the formation of a council. But he raised the significant question of whether the United Nations would desert the process if the situation were to change. Could the Afghan people count on the permanent involvement of the United Nations in the peace process? The Head of the special mission assured him that the United Nations commitment to peace in Afghanistan was strong.

26. The Head of the special mission then travelled to Mazar-i-Sharif to meet General Dostum, who expressed his full support for the United Nations efforts and proposals. He agreed on the need to include independent personalities and was flexible on the modalities of his representation on the council.

27. Thereafter, on 31 October 1994, the Head of the special mission went to Herat, where he met Governor Ismael Khan and emphasized that peace could not be achieved without the participation of all the warring parties. Governor Ismael Khan said that he would support the United Nations peace efforts.

B. National reconstruction

28. As already mentioned in the progress report of 1 July 1994 (A/49/208-S/1994/766), there is consensus that a major international effort to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan is essential, with particular emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the country, as well as the re-establishment of medical and educational systems, rebuilding public administration and addressing the problem of narcotics production. Many view the lack of economic alternatives as one of the factors which keep the war going. All Afghans, including the leaders, are in favour of restarting reconstruction efforts as soon as possible and view this as integral to establishing a sustainable peace process. Political and economic activity must work together in Afghanistan in ways that encourage peace.

29. In areas where United Nations assistance programmes have already been implemented, sustainable activity, more responsible leadership and effective administration are evident. The methodology involved enhances community participation and the building of stability at the local level, leading to the resumption of economic activity.

30. During August 1994, the Resident Representative of UNDP and the economist of the special mission held a series of consultations with Afghan leaders in the main regions of the country to identify a range of projects which would be suitable for immediate implementation and attractive to donors as a means of indicating their confidence in and support for the overall peace process. The total value of these projects is approximately $105 million. They include: an expansion of activities already being successfully implemented by the United Nations, for which a logistical support capacity and management structure is already in place; new programmes in areas not adequately addressed in the past, such as health and education; and special projects with high local visibility and impact that either provide large-scale employment or are labour intensive, thereby giving credibility to the United Nations and the peace process as well as to local leaders. Details of these projects are contained in annex I. Member States are being approached by UNDP to support, either bilaterally or multilaterally, the projects identified as being of highest priority, with due respect for regional balance and neutrality. However, progress in the peace process remains a precondition for increased donor interest and approval of investment for reconstruction.

III. REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

A. Beginning the rehabilitation process

31. By the end of 1993, agreement had been reached with the authorities in Kabul on the final text of the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation prepared by UNDP with the participation of all other United Nations agencies operational in Afghanistan, the multilateral lending institutions and coordinating bodies of the non-governmental organizations. In December 1993, a series of individual briefings were arranged with representatives of major donor countries to inform them of the work done, in the optimistic belief that a stable government could soon be formed with which a more detailed policy dialogue could begin, leading to the formulation of a detailed rehabilitation strategy that could, in turn, be presented to a donor conference. In the last week of December 1993, the Resident Representative of UNDP for Afghanistan and the Chief of the World Bank resident mission in Pakistan held discussions with the authorities at Kabul, restarting a relationship with the multilateral lending institutions that had ceased 14 years before. The outbreak of renewed hostilities in the capital on the first day of 1994, with a new set of alliances, was a serious setback to this process. The main functions of government have since collapsed, as many members of the civil service have taken refuge elsewhere, and this has made it impossible to begin a policy dialogue at the national level until the peace process can move forward.

B. United Nations activities already under way

32. The United Nations development system has nevertheless continued throughout the last year to carry out operations in the many parts of the country that are peaceful. In most of the 29 provinces, the rehabilitation process, assisted by the United Nations and the many non-governmental organizations operating in Afghanistan, has been under way for several years following the departure of Soviet troops in 1988 and has greatly facilitated the return of some 2 million refugees to date. In the more remote parts of the country, which were less affected by the war, Afghans have reached the limits of available technology and are in a development situation no different from that of poor, mountain peoples elsewhere in Western Asia. The United Nations has, therefore, continued to provide a range of assistance programmes that are flexible and appropriate, respond to priorities identified with local leaders and aim at furthering economic productivity with the maximum community participation, in the hope that building stability at the village and district level will gradually contribute to the national political process.

33. During the last year, the majority of the United Nations operational activities for rehabilitation in Afghanistan focused on human development and poverty alleviation and consisted of a coherent group of programmes/projects aimed at directly assisting rural communities. A certain amount of assistance is targeted for urban areas, particularly for shelter and water supply. Primary rural target areas are those that are peaceful and therefore have refugee-return potential. The two large-scale UNDP rural rehabilitation umbrella programmes in the north and the south, engaged in the sectors of crop production and protection, livestock health, irrigation, feeder roads, and water and sanitation, spent some US$ 12 million on small-scale rural interventions. These activities, which were executed by UNDP/Office for Project Services, were implemented through subcontracts with national and international non-governmental organizations. They have successfully established a particular methodology to develop better consultation with and participation by the local communities. UNDP/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) programmes addressing crop production and protection spent over $1.5 million in the last year.

34. Under the agricultural rehabilitation programme, over 4,000 tons of high quality seed of improved varieties of food crops and 1,000 tons of cotton seeds (largely funded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan and the European Community and to a lesser extent by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were dispatched and distributed to farmers as a package with over 450 tons of fertilizer. A well-equipped seed testing laboratory has been established in Mazar-i-Sharif, and the seed processing plants there and at Herat have been repaired. The total yield from imported seed distributed by the above programmes is calculated to have exceeded 80,000 tons, more than the total World Food Programme grain delivered to Afghanistan last year. In addition, the irrigation of 125,000 hectares of land increased production/grain yield by another 100,000 tons. A series of training courses were organized in various aspects of agronomy, seed and crop production and plant protection across most of the major wheat-growing areas in northern Afghanistan, including the training of 30 supervisors/trainers and 239 crop extension workers in locust/sunpest

control covering over 190,000 hectares of crop land. Over 20,000 farmers were trained through extension services. FAO, with funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, provided some 13,800 high quality budded fruit trees to farmers through non-governmental organizations. WFP food-for-work projects assisted in the rehabilitation of over 8,000 hectares of orchards.

35. For livestock health, UNDP/Office for Project Services contracted 21 non-governmental organizations to treat a total of 19.3 million animals and 177 districts to be covered by veterinary field units at a cost of $3.1 million. The UNDP/FAO veterinary services project, based at Mazar, conducted training courses for veterinarians, paraveterinarians and vaccinators, and distributed vaccines, equipment and medicines in 11 northern provinces. Privatization of veterinary services is now well established in both UNDP/Office for Project Services and UNDP/FAO project areas. Under a UNDP/FAO sericulture project 2,500 boxes of silkworm eggs donated by the Government of China were distributed to more than 1,300 families in 7 districts of northern and western Afghanistan.

36. In irrigation, UNDP/Office for Project Services, under the northern rural rehabilitation programme, rehabilitated 169 kilometres of canals, 14 primary supply/source structures, 7 secondary delivery structures and 46 canal protection structures, ensuring reliable supply of water to 305 villages with a crop area of 65,701 hectares. Under the southern programme, 56 sub-projects were implemented by non-governmental organizations for the rehabilitation of over 1,023 kilometres of canals and karezes and the reconstruction of 227,800 cubic metres of structures. Using funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, FAO continued work on the rehabilitation of traditional irrigation systems in the lower Kunar valley and East Paktia, and started new work in Nangahar and Laghman, bringing an estimated 12,318 hectares back into production. WFP food-for-work projects contributed to the cleaning of 1,500 kilometres of canals and 16,000 metres of karezes. UNHCR funded 25 irrigation projects in 6 provinces which were implemented through UNDP/Office for Project Services and non-governmental organizations, and 24 projects in 4 other provinces which were self-implemented. All 49 UNHCR projects made use of food-for-work from WFP. The combined effects of the UNDP/Office for Project Services, FAO, UNHCR and WFP programmes have been dramatic, playing a major role in the return of large numbers of refugees and the restoration of agriculture in these provinces.

37. WFP food-for-work projects contributed to the repair of 1,296 kilometres of roads. In addition, some 50 villages were provided with better road access in northern Afghanistan and rehabilitation of 52 kilometres of roads was completed by UNDP/Office for Project Services through 17 subcontracted non-governmental organizations in the south and east. UNHCR funded the rehabilitation of key structures (bridges, culverts) through six projects in Herat (implemented by UNDP/Office for Project Services), one project in Logar implemented by a non-governmental organization, and six projects in Herat and Nimroz that were self-implemented.

38. In the health, water supply and sanitation sector, major accomplishments included a range of activities covering both emergency assistance and rehabilitation. As it is impossible to categorize these separately, no attempt

has been made to distinguish them. WHO spent $3.2 million from its regular budget and $1.5 million through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, while UNICEF expenditure was over $8 million from general resources and supplementary funds. WFP also implemented food-for-work projects, detailed below. WHO, along with the Ministry of Public Health, identified priority activities for strengthening casualty departments of hospitals in six regions, disease control, in-services training and retraining of health personnel. UNICEF and WHO supported the training of health workers in all aspects of primary health care with emphasis on maternal and child health care. Emergency health support was provided to displaced families in Mazar and Jalalabad, to Tajik refugees in the north and to regional, provincial and district level hospitals. UNICEF and WHO also provided surgical kits and support for rehabilitation of hospitals and health centres, including a number of generators, heaters, ambulances and fuel. In addition, WHO transferred about 100 tons of medical supplies to Kabul for emergency medical treatment. The expanded programme of immunization of UNICEF focused on the under-two-year target groups.

39. Water and sanitation activities by UNICEF expanded in 10 provinces. Five hundred and seventy hand-pumps were installed and 450 others repaired. One hundred and eighty deep-wells were drilled and 16 deep production wells installed with submersible power pumps. Sixteen kilometres of pipes were installed for pumping and distribution of drinking water. Water systems of major hospitals in Mazar, Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad were repaired. UNDP/Office for Project Services provided assistance to Herat Hospital and Antany and Jamburiat Hospitals at Kabul. UNDP/Office for Project Services provided 149 villages with rehabilitated and improved water supply, reaching 120,000 people in northern provinces. UNDP/Office for Project Services restored the electricity and water supply for Kabul city four times during lulls in recurrent fighting, providing piped water to over 400,000 during the cholera epidemic. WFP also implemented 14 food-for-work sanitation projects and 6 water supply projects.

40. In the shelter sector, UNDP/United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) continued to support and facilitate the reconstruction activities of war-affected communities in both rural and urban areas of Afghanistan. The programme has focused on activities which aim to improve availability of affordable building materials for the reconstruction of housing and community facilities, establishing or upgrading production enterprises to improve the supply of concrete beams, windows and doors. To date, more than 8,000 families have been assisted by direct support in construction of shelter under the programme, with a further 10,000 families benefiting from community upgrading or relief activities supported by UNCHS with inputs from UNDP ($2 million last year), UNHCR, UNICEF and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. WFP food-for-work projects have also been supervised by UNCHS, with a total output of 6,800 houses reconstructed during the year. In addition to its emergency relief programmes, including urban food security, WFP provided over 32,000 tons of food aid for rehabilitation in all parts of Afghanistan, with seven field offices, at Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Bamyan, Faizabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat.

41. For basic education, UNICEF assisted with rehabilitation of 15 schools in Herat and provided education kits to schools in Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Faizabad. Through WFP food-for-work projects 23 schools were repaired during the year. UNESCO, using funds from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, continued to distribute basic education materials in a cross-border programme from Pakistan. Similarly, ILO, also funded by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, carried out technical skills training for 138 Afghans with three mobile units in south-west Afghanistan from a base at Quetta. For services for the disabled, UNDP/Office for Project Services contracted five non-governmental organizations, which provided 5,901 disabled Afghans with training, treatment and integration in local communities in six provinces using funds from the Government of Sweden. UNDP/ILO contracted three non-governmental organizations to undertake skills training for the disabled in eight provinces, including the placement of 629 disabled persons in community training, a survey of 4,000 disabled persons, placement of 34 disabled persons in employment, training courses for employment support workers and distribution of donations.

42. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), developed a community rehabilitation strategy against drug abuse to attract support from local communities to combat production, processing, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. UNDCP funded more than 50 infrastructure rehabilitation projects and sub-projects implemented by non-governmental organizations aimed at improved education, health, income generation and agricultural production and at training for Afghans. A detoxification facility was established in Badakhshan Province for the treatment of drug addicts. UNDCP conducted 17 drug-awareness in-house training courses for more than 378 medical practitioners, teachers, religious leaders, community workers, staff of non-governmental organizations, resource women and health workers. Drug awareness was enhanced by a number of events carried out in the refugee camps and inside Afghanistan. More than 160,000 items of publicity material were distributed during 1993.

43. A total of 73 United Nations Volunteers (UNV) specialists, funded by UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, WFP and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, provided services to the United Nations system in 1993. They provided technical assistance in basic education and technical training, water supply and environmental sanitation, health, veterinary science, seed technology, plant protection and emergency power supply. They also provided assistance in food aid monitoring and management, voluntary repatriation and emergency programmes.

C. The link between humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation

44. A large portion of the United Nations assistance during the last year has been devoted to humanitarian relief. In parallel with its ongoing rehabilitation work, the United Nations development system has been able to support the work of the United Nations humanitarian programme in meeting immediate, life-sustaining needs. It has done this by providing a corps of specialized staff with a well-established logistical support capacity capable of assisting in the delivery of emergency relief and, at the same time, ensuring

that the design of the operation helps generate maximum local participation and commitment, setting the stage for more sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction in the future. In the last year, technical and logistical contributions by the United Nations development system for the humanitarian programme included, inter alia: road repair, facilitating the return of refugees; piped water supply in Herat, and water and sanitation facilities in Herat regional hospital; distribution of shelter materials to the displaced in Kabul and surrounding areas; supervision of sanitation programmes in Kabul; technical supervision and delivery of agricultural inputs from a variety of donors; technical and management backstopping of community-based services for disabled Afghans; coordination and monitoring of women's programmes funded by the Nordic Fund; and provision of UNV specialists as food-aid monitors, voluntary repatriation monitors, logistics specialists and emergency programmes managers.

D. Narcotics

45 Since the beginning of the armed conflict in 1979, income from opium production and trafficking has contributed significantly to supplementing the meagre means of livelihood for the people of Afghanistan. Income from this source has also supported armed resistance groups. Opium production has intensified with the recent return of more than 2 million refugees, many of whom have resettled in the main poppy growing areas, notably Nangahar and Helmand, and has been exacerbated by the progressive collapse of the Government and the breakdown of authority, law and order. A recent UNDCP survey of poppy cultivation in eight opium-producing provinces of Afghanistan revealed a further sharp expansion in estimates of production compared to the previous year when the dry opium yield was estimated at around 2,000 tons. Afghanistan thereby figures among the world's largest producers of illicit opium. The increased production has already affected Afghanistan's neighbours. Apart from the long-standing effects in Pakistan and Iran, there is now evidence of escalating drug traffic via the Central Asian Republics on the northern border of Afghanistan.

46. As noted in the progress report of the United Nations special mission, the lack of central authority and the instability in the country have contributed to an increase in production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Further exacerbated by the paucity of resources in the decisive transition from emergency to reconstruction and the absence of alternative income opportunities, this alarming situation, if unchecked, will not only increase drug abuse in Afghanistan and in its neighbours, but will also have serious implications for the country's political future as well as for the global spread of the drug menace. It calls for urgent concerted efforts by all national and international bodies to integrate drug control concerns into the priority agenda for political reconciliation, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, and in the longer-term sustainable development in Afghanistan. For the first time, detailed baseline data on opium production at the village level are now available. The survey results will be shared by the United Nations with all donors, with a view to developing a common strategy that will ensure that assistance benefits those not producing opium, and that those producing opium do not receive assistance unless specific agreements are reached with the local communities on firm commitments and achievements in the reduction of opium poppy cultivation.

IV. EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

47. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly urgently appealed to all organizations and programmes of the United Nations system, specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and urged all Member States to respond to United Nations consolidated appeals issued for this purpose.

48. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, there have been three new consolidated appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance. The first was issued in October 1993 and covered needs arising during the six-month period of winter. The October appeal sought a total of $59.8 million. As at 31 March 1994, $32.4 million had been pledged or contributed towards this appeal. The second appeal was issued in April 1994, for the six-month summer period. It reflected the urgent new needs which had arisen as a result of the renewed outbreak of hostilities in Kabul in January 1994. It sought $62.1 million, of which $25.5 million was required in order to respond to the new humanitarian developments, and $36.6 million was required for the continuation of the existing humanitarian programmes. As of 30 September, $31.1 million had been pledged or contributed towards this appeal.

49. The most recent appeal, launched on 10 November 1994, requests $106.4 million to cover the one-year period from 1 October 1994 to 30 September 1995 and the specific needs of the winter and summer seasons. The emphasis for winter is on emergency help for up to 800,000 displaced persons, of whom 350,000 are in camps near Jalalabad. During the summer, the focus will be on the repatriation and reintegration of 700,000 refugees from Iran and Pakistan. United Nations agencies will also support the clearance of 20 square kilometres of minefields, the distribution of 230,000 tons of food aid, emergency programmes in the fields of health, water supply and sanitation, and a mass-immunization campaign.

50. I will continue to review the humanitarian situation in view of the ongoing developments in Afghanistan. Renewed consolidated appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance will be issued, as appropriate.

A. Implementation of humanitarian programmes

1. Internally displaced persons

The situation in Kabul

51. The fighting in Kabul since 1 January 1994 has been of an intensity never experienced before. The scale of destruction has been unprecedented. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that 7,000 people were killed and more than 80,000 injured in the first nine months of the year. The suffering of ordinary civilians has been further exacerbated by an economic blockade of the city. Prices of essential goods have far outstripped the resources of most of the estimated 1 million remaining inhabitants, who have been living in fear and destitution. As of the end of September 1994, over 300,000 people were believed to be displaced within the city, many living in

public buildings and others living in overcrowded conditions with family members or friends. When I was in Islamabad in early September 1994, I appealed for a moratorium on the shelling and rocketing of civilian areas in and around Kabul to facilitate the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian supplies.

52. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan has worked continuously with WFP to obtain access to all parts of Kabul where there are people in need and to ensure the delivery of emergency relief supplies. Between 1 January and 31 July 1994, WFP delivered to the Kabul region some 7,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour, as well as 100 tons of supplementary food and medical supplies for UNICEF, 90 tons of medical supplies from WHO and 55 tons of relief materials from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). The WFP food aid was distributed to the most needy displaced persons by a number of non-governmental organizations working in Kabul. WFP food aid was also made available to ICRC for Kabul. UNICEF national staff established 30 centres for nutrition and oral rehydration therapy, at which 5,000 children received help every week. UNICEF also installed and repaired hand pumps for clear water supply. WHO provided medical supplies to the hospitals and clinics operated by the Ministry of Public Health. Habitat supported projects in the fields of water supply and sanitation.

The situation in Jalalabad

53. As soon as the fighting erupted in Kabul on 1 January 1994, an exodus of displaced persons from that city took place. The vast majority headed east, towards Jalalabad and the border with Pakistan. On 12 January, the Government of Pakistan closed its borders to these new arrivals, and later imposed passport and visa requirements for all Afghan nationals. As a result of this decision, the number of displaced people in Jalalabad rose dramatically. The Jalalabad authorities allocated a site at Sar Shahi, 20 kilometres away, for the establishment of a camp. As of 30 September, this camp and smaller camps nearby accommodated nearly 350,000 persons.

54. The United Nations agencies, with the support of a number of non-governmental organizations, mounted a major relief operation for displaced persons in Jalalabad. Under the overall coordination of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, UNHCR supervised the layout and management of the camp at Sar Shahi and ensured the supply of tents and other household equipment. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan supervised the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance from the site. WFP provided the food requirements and managed the logistics for the whole operation. UNICEF supervised the water supply, which involved the continuous mobilization of 30 tankers, while WHO coordinated the provision of health services. At the request of other agencies involved in the assistance programmes, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan has assumed managerial responsibility for the camp at Sar Shahi. In addition to the assistance in the camps, the United Nations agencies also provided support for the displaced in the city. WFP organized a bakeries project, in which over 100,000 needy people living in Jalalabad received subsidized bread.

55. Thousands of people from Kabul have sought refuge in communities in other parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations agencies and their non-governmental organization partners have tried to integrate the needs of these communities into their ongoing humanitarian programmes.

2. Mine clearance

56. Substantial progress has now been made in the removal of land-mines from the priority areas to which refugees have returned or are seeking to return. Nevertheless, the presence of land-mines remains one of the major constraints preventing refugees from deciding to return to their homes.

57. The Mine Clearance Programme of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan comprises four main components: mine-awareness, minefield survey, mine-clearance training and mine clearance. It is implemented by seven Afghan non-governmental organizations, employing over 2,500 Afghan nationals. During the period under review, the Programme continued to operate in 19 provinces of Afghanistan, without serious security constraints.

58. In March 1994, the report of the national survey of the mines situation in Afghanistan showed that there were 456 square kilometres of minefields in Afghanistan, of which 113.5 square kilometres were classified as high priority for clearance. As of 15 July, the Mine Clearance Programme of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan had cleared 45.1 square kilometres of the priority areas, leaving some 68.4 square kilometres still to be cleared. At present rates of clearance, this will require another four to five years.

59. A total of $7.5 million was received for the Mine Clearance Programme against the October 1993 appeal, and $3.8 million had been pledged as at 31 July against the April 1994 appeal.

3. Voluntary repatriation

60. Approximately 945,500 Afghan refugees returned to their homes in 1993, of which 605,500 were from Iran and 340,000 from Pakistan. Of this number, 337,495 refugees from Iran and 132,627 from Pakistan took advantage of the repatriation grant programme supported by UNHCR and WFP. Although substantially fewer than originally projected, these numbers nevertheless represent a major repatriation movement.

61. A Tripartite Repatriation Commission, established in August 1993 by UNHCR and the Governments of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a similar commission established earlier by UNHCR and the Governments of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, met regularly during the period under review. All concerned Governments continued to guarantee the right of Afghan refugees to return voluntarily.

62. Despite the heavy fighting in Kabul during the first nine months of 1994, repatriation of refugees from Iran and Pakistan continued. UNHCR reported that 83,678 refugees from Iran and 25,708 from Pakistan took advantage of the repatriation grants between 1 January and 30 September 1994, although the numbers observed crossing the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan have been considerably higher.

63. The International Organization for Migration continued to operate a programme of subsidized transport in Iran. The programme from Herat to the northern provinces had to be suspended in October 1993, as the result of increased security hazards and deteriorating road conditions. Efforts are being made to develop an alternative route through Turkmenistan.

64. Through its quick impact projects, UNHCR, with the cooperation of WFP, assisted returning families to rebuild their homes and supported irrigation and drinking-water projects, as well as road-repair and income-generation projects, in returnee communities. However, shortage of resources limited the scale of these activities and it is felt that, aside from the security problems, the lack of sufficient support inside Afghanistan may be hampering the return of refugees from Iran and Pakistan.

4. Food assistance

65. Food aid has been provided by WFP to assist displaced persons, particularly in Kabul and Jalalabad; to support the voluntary repatriation from Pakistan and Iran; to provide emergency feeding in areas struck by earthquakes, landslides, floods or drought; to provide food to vulnerable groups such as widows, orphans, and disabled and displaced persons; and to provide food-for-work programmes to help local communities to undertake public utility works and to generate temporary employment opportunities. An estimated 2 million Afghans in all parts of the country benefited from these programmes in 1993. The emphasis of the activities of WFP has remained the provision of food for life-sustaining activities. However, about half of all food assistance was allocated to the food-for-work programme, through which WFP also contributed to the ongoing rehabilitation work on roads, bridges, irrigation canals, water systems and public buildings, thus facilitating the repatriation and reintegration of hundreds of thousands of returning refugees.

66. A total of 54,000 tons of food aid was distributed in 1993. As at 30 September, 140,000 tons had been distributed in 1994.

5. Health, water supply and sanitation

67. Although security problems continued to hamper the implementation of several planned activities, WHO and UNICEF worked on the rehabilitation of the health services in most areas of the country. The focus was primarily on maternal and child health care. WHO and UNICEF provided emergency health support to displaced families in Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and elsewhere, as well as help for emergency maternity care to a number of hospitals and health centres in 23 provinces. The educational radio and television programmes on

child survival development were continued. WHO provided training courses for health care workers in different fields and distributed essential drugs for maternal child health services. Because of the events in 1993 and early 1994, the provision of emergency medical supplies and equipment to health facilities became top priority for WHO.

68. After the cholera epidemic of June 1993 had been brought under control in October, programmes were concentrated on the prevention of communicable and diarrhoeal diseases through training, extension of diagnostic facilities and provision of preventive measures. The provision of safe water remained an important factor in the prevention of water-borne diseases. UNICEF carried out repairs to the water supply systems and upgraded delivery capacity in 10 provinces, including Kabul. Because of the complete breakdown of water and power supplies in Kabul since the beginning of 1994, Habitat undertook projects to improve water supplies, sanitation and drainage in and around public institutions and cleared out large quantities of waste through a food-for-work programme with WFP.

6. Agriculture

69. Support for the rehabilitation of agriculture in Afghanistan continued to provide returning refugees and displaced persons with a limited form of income, thus facilitating their resettlement. FAO provided high-quality seed and fertilizer, fruit trees and root stocks, renovated and restocked veterinary clinics, trained basic veterinary workers and extensionists in plant protection and, together with UNDP/Office for Project Services, restored village irrigation systems. Most of these activities were implemented through community-based small-scale projects.

7. Emergency support for social programmes

70. Although the emphasis of the humanitarian assistance was emergency relief programmes addressing physical needs, social programmes for basic education, vocational training and drug-abuse control continued to be supported in those areas of the country where their implementation was possible. UNICEF carried out projects in the north and the west. Education kits were distributed to schools in Herat, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad. Schools in Herat were reopened, often in make-shift buildings. UNDCP provided basic educational facilities to boys and girls and skills training to adults in opium poppy growing regions in Afghanistan and organized special events in order to create greater awareness about the dangers of drug abuse. ILO provided training in occupational, as well as administrative and supervisory, skills to staff of non-governmental organizations.

B. Coordination and security

71. Throughout the period under review, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan has continued to provide coordination and logistical support for humanitarian programmes under the

direction of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. In addition to its other activities, and in accordance with its mandate, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan continued to exercise responsibility for essential common service projects to support the activities of United Nations agencies participating in the humanitarian programmes.

72. Security of United Nations staff working in Afghanistan remains a major concern. Between mid-July 1993 and the end of the year, conditions in Kabul allowed the United Nations agencies to maintain a continuous presence of international staff in the city, on a rotating basis. It had been hoped that conditions would have improved to the point where a full international presence could have been resumed. However, the outbreak of heavy fighting in Kabul on 1 January 1994 forced the United Nations to evacuate all international staff on 8 January. Missions of international staff to Kabul were only possible during formal cease-fires declared for the visits of the United Nations special mission. The security situation in Kabul remains a major concern. It is hoped that conditions there will soon allow for the resumption of at least a limited presence of United Nations international staff.

73. Security concerns in other parts of Afghanistan have only occasionally impeded the work of the United Nations humanitarian agencies in 1994. During the reporting period, the United Nations agencies maintained a resident presence of international staff in Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif, and regular missions were undertaken to Bamyan, Faizabad, Kandahar, Khost and other areas, as required.

74. In Herat, the focus was on support for refugees returning from Iran. In Kandahar, after a long period of instability which seriously limited the range of assistance activities, the United Nations agencies initiated humanitarian assistance efforts in June 1994. In eastern Afghanistan, particular attention has been given to mine clearance and irrigation repair in areas to which refugees from Pakistan are preparing to return, notably in Khost, Logar, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. In the north, in addition to assistance to refugees returning from Iran and Pakistan and the efforts to meet emergency needs in chronic food deficit areas such as Badakshan and Bamyan provinces, assistance to refugees from Tajikistan and people displaced from Kabul has been provided.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

75. Since March 1994, the efforts of the special mission have improved the prospects for peace in Afghanistan. The Quetta meeting succeeded in bringing together a group of personalities who reflected the broadly held views of the Afghan people and could not be viewed as being linked to any particular group or party. Its recommendations on an early transfer of power to an authoritative council, a country-wide cease-fire, a security force for Kabul and the subsequent establishment of a transitional government or the convening of a Loya Jirga have created a framework within which it may finally be possible to initiate a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. The success of the Quetta meeting in establishing a credible set of ideas, in a

manner consistent with the principle of broad-based participation, which is rooted in Afghan traditions, has given the United Nations a non-partisan basis on which it can develop practical peace proposals.

76. The key to progress lies in the earliest possible formation of the authoritative council. All sides seem to have accepted this idea, though several of them indicated that they needed more time to study and discuss the details of the set of ideas of the Quetta meeting. The composition of the council is likely to be a controversial issue, on which extensive further consultations may be required. Clearly those consultations should be entrusted to the special mission. I therefore intend to keep the special mission in existence, and I have asked its Head, Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri, to return to Afghanistan in the middle of December to resume this work. I have also asked him to make clear to his interlocutors that the early establishment of the authoritative council will be a test of the commitment of the Afghan leaders to the peace process, upon which the international community's readiness to continue its peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan will depend. I shall report to the General Assembly as soon as the outcome of this further phase in the work of the special mission is known.

77. The activities of the special mission in Afghanistan, and in particular Mr. Mestiri's ability to travel to many, though not all, parts of the country, have reinforced me in the view that it is necessary to establish a political presence of the United Nations in Afghanistan in order to support the special mission and maintain continuity of contact between the United Nations and the various leaders inside the country. I accordingly propose to establish a small office composed of a Director, a Political Affairs Officer, two Military Advisers and the necessary support staff. Initially, this office will be established at Jalalabad, but it will move to Kabul as soon as conditions there permit. The political functions of the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is currently located at Islamabad, will be transferred to the office in Jalalabad/Kabul. Its members will travel, as necessary, to Pakistan (and indeed other neighbouring countries) in order to consult with Afghan leaders resident there. The United Nations humanitarian effort in Afghanistan will continue to be directed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which will return to Afghanistan as soon as possible. With these changes, and assuming the continuing existence of the special mission, I no longer believe it necessary to have a Personal Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Assistant Secretary-General level.

78. The programme budget implications of the above proposals will shortly be submitted to the General Assembly in the normal way.

79. The consultations of the special mission during its third phase have indicated that if the authoritative council is established and agrees to implement the proposal for a neutral security force in Kabul, the Council is likely to ask the United Nations to provide financial support for the force. As noted in paragraph 19 above, the Head of the special mission has entered into no commitment in this respect. I have asked him to make it clear, in the next phase of his consultations, that there is no precedent for such a force to be financed directly by the United Nations and that the most that the Afghanistan

parties can expect is the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for which I would solicit contributions from Member States interested in supporting the peace process in Afghanistan. It is, however, likely that, if the security force is established and if the authoritative council so requests, I would recommend the addition of further military or police advisers to the proposed office in Jalalabad/Kabul in order to provide technical assistance to the force.

80. There is one other matter which, though it is not directly covered by the mandate of the special mission, I wish to bring to the attention of the General Assembly. This is the fact that the question of the release from Kabul of the former President, Dr. Najibullah, has not yet been resolved. Four members of his entourage (one woman and three children) were able to leave Kabul for New Delhi in 1994, but Dr. Najibullah and his other three companions remain in the compound of the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they have been since April 1992. I have written to President Rabbani about this question and have taken it up with a number of Afghan interlocutors. My Personal Representative has done the same. I regret to report that our efforts have not yet produced the desired result. I am greatly concerned that, with continuing heavy fighting in Kabul, Dr. Najibullah's life and those of his colleagues remain in serious danger. I therefore appeal to all Member States that enjoy influence with the various parties to support my efforts to obtain the release of Dr. Najibullah and his companions. I remain ready to make my good offices available to help negotiate any agreement that may be required for this purpose.

81. In conclusion, I believe that the activities of the special mission confirm that there is a role for the United Nations to play in helping to end the conflict in Afghanistan and that conditions may now exist to make substantive progress in that direction. I accordingly seek endorsement by the General Assembly of the approach set out in the present report, and I appeal to all Member States both to support the nascent peace process and to respond generously to the appeals for funds to finance the Organization's various humanitarian and developmental efforts in Afghanistan.

ANNEX

1. Recognizing the special role of reconstruction in the peace process of Afghanistan, Mr. Mestiri asked the UNDP Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator for Afghanistan and the economist of the special mission to travel to different parts of the country to consult with Afghans and United Nations colleagues to identify a series of key reconstruction projects. The major criteria for selection of such projects include the following:

(a) Most should fall within the priorities established by the Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation (UNDP, October 1993) and should result from consultations with local authorities and communities;

(b) Their implementation should, to the extent possible, be based on existing technical capacity;

(c) Most projects should be labour intensive to encourage demobilization and should contribute to income generation and the revival of local economies;

(d) They must not lead to increased production of narcotics, and in those areas where production exists, should contribute to reduction;

(e) Some key projects should have a symbolic effect with high visibility and immediate impact;

(f) They should be attractive to donors with obvious sustainability.

2. Key projects, evenly distributed over all parts of the country should receive assistance immediately, since economic stability will contribute to political stability. A package of projects, totalling approximately $105 million will be presented by UNDP to donors in the following broad areas:

(a) Food production and irrigation;

(b) Livestock production;

(c) Water and sanitation, both urban and rural;

(d) Infrastructure (secondary roads, power supply and key airports);

(e) Health and education systems;

(f) Rehabilitation of basic industrial plants.

3. There are three major requirements in the above areas at the present time: (a) full utilization of the potential within existing programmes; (b) urgent initiatives in sectors not currently being addressed because of lack of resources; and (c) special highly visible projects illustrating the renewed interest of the international community in peace and reconstruction:

(a) The major ongoing rehabilitation activities implemented by the United Nations have a considerable absorptive capacity for additional funding, utilizing existing management structures and resulting in wider geographical coverage and accelerated progress towards long-term sustainable development goals. Five specific programmes already have nationwide outreach and delivery mechanisms and have been designed to serve as platforms for additional donor funding. Together they seek a total of $40 million immediate funding for the period 1995-1996, additional to a $37 million commitment already made by UNDP:

(i) Rehabilitation of small-scale rural infrastructure (irrigation, water supply, small structures and access) in direct cooperation with rural communities, which determine priorities. With $17.7 million already committed by UNDP, this programme seeks an additional $17 million for 1995-1996 for increased geographical coverage;

(ii) Food production programmes aiming at increased and improved in-country production of seeds and crops, rehabilitation of orchards, creation of a more self-sustaining plant protection system and general rehabilitation of local farming systems. With $7 million committed by UNDP (for FAO execution), this programme seeks another $10 million for increased outreach and accelerated progress towards sustainable systems;

(iii) A livestock health and production programme working towards a nationwide system of privately sustained district veterinary clinics. With $6 million already committed by UNDP (for FAO execution) this programme seeks another $6 million for increased geographical outreach and accelerated progress towards sustainable livestock production systems;

(iv) Rehabilitation of small-scale urban infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, shelter and access) in direct cooperation with urban communities and neighbourhoods, with $5 million needed for expanded geographical coverage;

(v) Rehabilitation of the disabled, creating a capacity within communities for local rehabilitation and integration of the disabled through a cross-sectoral approach ranging from medical assistance to functional and vocational training. With $2 million committed by UNDP, this programme seeks another $2 million for gradual expansion;

(b) Key priorities which are not being addressed by donors include: power supply in most conurbations, rebuilding and furnishing of schools where teachers are available, urban and rural health systems where qualified staff are already available, and major irrigation systems. The total indicative amount for these programmes might amount to some $35 million;

(c) One of the most significant contributions to the peace process could be high-visibility projects. These would create an image of stability and normality following the recent devastation and will have an immediate impact on employment and economic recovery. These projects should include: key airport facilities such as runways and communications (which would require reciprocal

non-aggression guarantees); industrial plants for cotton, fertilizer, cement and building materials; and city and secondary roads which are not strategic. The total indicative amount could exceed $30 million.

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THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI

Report of the Secretary-General

1. This report is being submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 48/27 B of 8 July 1994, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly regular reports on the work of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti.

2. On 13 July 1994, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, after consultation with the acting Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), decided to authorize the evacuation, for reasons of security, of members of the OAS/United Nations International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) after the de facto authorities had declared their presence undesirable in Haiti.

3. On 22 October 1994, 13 observers who had been evacuated to the Dominican Republic returned to Port-au-Prince to join the Executive Director and the staff of the Office of Human Rights, who had arrived on 6 October to evaluate the conditions for a return of MICIVIH. Seven more observers came to reinforce this first group during the week of 7 November. Others are expected in the coming weeks.

4. The activities of the Mission resumed on 26 October with the reopening of an office in Port-au-Prince. From 26 October to 10 November, some 527 persons appeared at the offices of the Mission; some were there to provide information on the general situation (with regard to, inter alia, human rights violations, activities of attachés or members of the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès en Haiti (FRAPH) and weapons caches), while others sought medical or humanitarian assistance or work, or wished to express their thanks to MICIVIH.

5. The observers made several visits to Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas to meet with the people again and inquire into reported human rights

violations. In addition, teams of observers visited the departments of Ouest, Artibonite, Nord and Centre.

6. The purpose of these visits was to evaluate the human rights situation, to meet with the population and grass-roots organizations and with local commanders of the Haitian armed forces and heads of detachments of the multinational force and international police monitors and to prepare for the redeployment of MICIVIH in the departments visited.

7. The observers noted that the population in general felt strongly that human rights violations should not remain unpunished. A certain amount of tension was observed in the areas where members of the armed forces who had committed such violations continued to perform their duties (in particular at Grand-Goâve).

8. The international observers received information on the situation which prevailed following their departure from Haiti on 13 July and before the arrival of the multinational force on 19 September. According to the first reports received, the campaign of terror characterized by extrajudicial executions, kidnappings and enforced disappearances against supporters of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide continued during the months of July and August and into the first week of September.

9. Although it does not have complete information on the whole country, the Mission has noted a significant improvement in the human rights situation since its return, in particular in the areas where the multinational forces are establishing a climate of freedom and security. The members of grass-roots organizations, who had been forced to live in hiding because of the campaign of terror conducted by the armed forces and paramilitary groups, have gradually emerged and have begun to exercise their fundamental rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

10. However, the situation in the rural areas is still disturbing. The disbandment of the corps of section chiefs on 28 October has not yet had an effect on the situation. The Mission has received information indicating that the section chiefs, attachés and members of the armed forces and of FRAPH have continued to repress the population in certain regions, especially supporters of the presence of the multinational forces and of the President's return.

11. The Civilian Mission has been informed of incidents that have taken place in the departments of Centre (Montagne Terrible), Ouest (Grand-Goâve), Centre (Mirebalais) and Artibonite (Saint-Michel de l'Attalaye). It is looking into these incidents.

12. Most of the people questioned by MICIVIH attribute the insecurity in rural areas to the fact that the former section chiefs, attachés and members of FRAPH have not been completely disarmed.

13. The Mission has also received a number of reports that mobs have been looting and destroying private homes and shops. In some cases the perpetrators were common criminals, while in other cases they appeared to be supporters of President Aristide. The constitutional authorities have reacted promptly to these attacks, denouncing them and taking measures to control them.

14. Members of Parliament and of political parties who were openly supportive of the military and who had declared their opposition to President Aristide's return complained of acts of intimidation and aggression committed against them.

15. Now that President Aristide has returned to Haiti and a legitimate Government is in place, the International Civilian Mission to Haiti is operating in a totally different context. The question now arises as to whether its mandate should be modified.

16. The General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 48/27 B of 8 July 1994, decided to authorize the extension of the mandate of the United Nations component of the Mission for an additional year according to the terms of reference and modalities negotiated with President Aristide. In its resolution 47/20 B of 23 April 1993, the Assembly had assigned to the Mission the initial task of verifying compliance with Haiti's international human rights obligations, with a view to making recommendations thereon, in order to assist in the establishment of a climate of freedom and tolerance propitious to the re-establishment of democracy in Haiti. However, the Organization of American States, in its resolution MRE/RES.2/91 of 8 October 1991 had given to the OAS component of the Civilian Mission a broader mandate which included facilitating the re-establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions. The terms of reference approved by President Aristide on 25 January 1993 indicated in the last paragraph (A/48/944, annex, para. 21) that discussions would be held to evaluate requirements and ways and means of strengthening democracy, accelerating economic development and modernizing and professionalizing the institutions that will guarantee justice and a stable democratic order. The United Nations and OAS were then to engage in the necessary consultations in order to implement these technical cooperation initiatives.

17. Discussions on the mandate of MICIVIH took place on 4 November 1994 in Washington between Mr. Gaviria, Secretary-General of OAS, Mr. Brahimi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, Mr. Granderson, Executive Director of MICIVIH, and other members of the joint OAS/United Nations Working Group. It was decided that MICIVIH would continue to give priority to the monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights in Haiti. As in the past, the Mission would document the human rights situation, make recommendations to the Haitian authorities, implement an information and civic education programme and help solve problems such as those relating to detentions, medical assistance to victims and the return of displaced persons. For instance, it would observe the forthcoming electoral campaign, during which it would monitor, in particular, respect for freedom of expression and association, and it might participate in the observation of the election itself. MICIVIH would also contribute to institution-building, particularly the strengthening of human rights organizations. It could, for example, offer assistance to the Truth Commission, the Reparations Commission and the soon-to-be established office for the protection of the citizenry, and to the Human Rights Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior. It could lend its support to Haitian non-governmental human rights organizations, help to train the staff of new human rights institutions and provide advice and assistance in legal matters. The teams of observers deployed in the provinces could, lastly, help in the Government's decentralization efforts.

18. In agreement with OAS, it is thus proposed that MICIVIH, while continuing to verify compliance with Haiti's human rights obligations and to promote respect for the rights of all Haitians, should contribute in so far as possible, to the strengthening of democratic institutic The broadening of its responsibilities would not have any financial implications, for the total number of its staff would remain unchanged.